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I. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
At the beginning of the 21st century, tax lawyers are subject to
complex and technical professional regulation.' While the incremental
changes in this regulation often prompt considerable debate at the time the
change emerges,2 the intellectual history of those debates and changes has
only recently begun to be written. In a prior article, I explored these
developments in the period 1945-1965, documenting a tax professionalism
that tended to be patriotic, philosophical, and pragmatic.4 In this Article, I
turn to the subsequent 20 years, documenting the domination of the
professional debates by committees and the ascent of a significantly more
constrained and technically oriented professionalism.
This first section of the Article highlights the themes and tones of the
1945-1965 tax ethics literature, and then provides the political context and an
overview of the legal changes in 1965-1985 that frame the tax ethics
literature of that period. Section II begins in 1965, documenting the history
of the first Formal Opinion (Opinion) on tax lawyer ethics issued by the
American Bar Association's (ABA) Committee on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility (PR Committee),s which after considerable criticism in the
ensuing years was substantially revised by a second Opinion in 1985. Section
III is focused on 1980-1985, investigating the first foray of the U.S.
Department of the Treasury (Treasury) into directly and significantly
regulating tax lawyers through Circular 230 6 -and the bar's response.
Section IV highlights the discussions that occurred on the sides of the
1. See, e.g., 31 C.F.R. §§ 10.20-10.22, 10.29, 10.33-10.37, 10.50-10.52
(2013).
2. See, e.g., Dan W. Holbrook, Imagine the Worst the US. Treasury Could
Do to Us-They've Done It, Revenge of the IRS: Circular 230 Changes Law
Practice, TENN. B.J., Aug. 2005, at 28; Edward M. Manigault & Steve R. Akers,
Circular 230-How It Changed Our Lives (Or At Least Our Practices), 20 PROB. &
PROP., May-June 2006, at 32; Isaac J. Roang, To Disclaim or Not to Disclaim: IRS
Circular 230 Requirements for Written Advice, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 937
(2006).
3. Dennis J. Ventry, Professor of Law at University of California Davis, has
written a series of Tax Notes articles on aspects of this history. See, e.g., Dennis J.
Ventry, Jr., Filling the Ethical Void: Treasury's 1986 Circular 230 Proposal, 112
TAX NOTES 691, 691 (Aug. 21, 2006).
4. Michael Hatfield, Legal Ethics and Federal Taxes, 1945-1965:
Patriotism, Duties, and Advice, 12 FLA. TAx REV. 1 (2012) [hereinafter Hatfield,
Legal Ethics].
5. This committee is now known as the Standing Committee on Ethics and
Professional Responsibility.
6. Treasury Dept. Circular No. 230, 31 C.F.R. Subtitle A, Part 10 (2013).
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debates over PR Committee Opinions and Circular 230. Section V provides
reflections on the 1945-1985 history of tax lawyer ethics.
A. Summary of 1945-1965 Tax Lawyer Ethics Literature
Elsewhere, I analyzed the tax ethics literature of 1945-1965, which
were the first two decades of the mass federal income tax as we know it.
During that period, the individuals writing on professional ethics for tax
lawyers were professional heavyweights8 who were socially and politically
active.9 Their writings often invoked patriotism and civic duty,o concerns
about both communism and consumerism," and the commercialization of the
legal profession.12 They were writing in a time in which the tax bar took the
time to issue a report on the importance of natural law for tax
jurisprudence.' 3 Their writings considered the problems of disclosure of tax
positions, 14 duties to the tax system," and the risk of over-cleverness in tax
advice.16 They did not hesitate to address client- and business-related
pressures or to explore the relationship between law and morals.'8 They
agreed that both tax lawyers and tax clients needed moral improvement,19
and many of them argued that the tax lawyer had a special duty to improve
the morality of clients, educating them as to the legitimacy of the tax
system.20 They tended to be optimistic and patriotic supporters of the tax
system, framing it within the nation's need for revenue in the Cold War.2'
They emphasized a civic duty to the tax system, though they debated how
best to understand the lawyer's professional duty to the tax system.22 They
tended to agree there were differences in the professional responsibilities of a
tax litigator and a tax advisor.23 They also tended to agree it was easier to
7. See Hatfield, Legal Ethics, supra note 4, at 2-3.
8. Id. at 5-8.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 11-15.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 11.
13. Id. at 8.
14. Id. at 28.
15. Id. at 15.
16. Id. at 39-41.
17. Id. at 46.
18. Id. at 47.
19. Id. at 49.
20. Id. at 50.
21. Id. at 48-49.
22. Id. at 50-51.
23. Id. at 51.
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find consensus on practical answers than on abstract principles, 24
emphasizing that practicing tax at the borderline was neither good ethics nor
good business.25 They valued broad judgment over technical arguments.26
And, although some asked for better guidance from the organized bar, 27 not
one of them began or ended the discussion of tax lawyers' ethics with an
appeal to the organized bar's Canons of Professional Responsibility or
Treasury's Circular 230.28 Indeed, rarely did any of these lawyers even cite
either.2 9
B. Political and Legal Context for 1965-1985 Ethics Literature
Following the prior one, this Article sets forth the history of tax
lawyers writing on legal ethics in the 1965-1985 period, which was a period
of considerable political crises and change. Within the context of these
broader changes, specific changes in the tax code and the professional ethics
standards for lawyers frame the debates over the professional responsibilities
of tax lawyers.
The decades from 1965-1985 were ones of profound political
change, highlighted by controversial policies, political disgraces, and the
emergence of a new American conservatism. In 1965, protests against the
U.S. involvement in Vietnam spread, and the Civil Rights Movement
brought violent reactions from police.3 0 In 1968, Martin Luther King, Jr. and
Robert Kennedy were both assassinated, and the Democratic Convention in
Chicago was met by rioters who were met by police brutality.31 The 1970s
began with escalating violence in Vietnam, the National Guard killing
students protesting the war in Vietnam,3 2 and the publication of the
"Pentagon Papers" documenting the government's deception of the public as
to events in Vietnam.33 There was both a break-in at the Democratic National
24. Id. at 23-28.
25. Id at 27.
26. Id. at 54-55.
27. Id at 55.
28. Id. at 55-56.
29. One notable exception would be Randolph E. Paul's questioning
whether Circular 230 provided a different standard than the one that binds all
lawyers. Although his writings were inconsistent, at the least, it is clear he thought it
was debatable. In any event, the use of Circular 230 is more of a literary device in
his article than an authority. See id. at 23-24.
30. BERNARD GRUN, THE TIMETABLES OF HISTORY: A HORIZONTAL
LINKAGE OF PEOPLE AND EVENTS 554 (3d ed. 1991) [hereinafter GRUN,
TIMETABLES].
31.Id at 560, 562
32. Id at 566.
33. Id at 570.
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Headquarters in the Watergate complex and a landslide reelection of
President Richard M. Nixon.3 4 Arab oil-producing nations began embargoing
oil shipments to the United States,3 5 worldwide inflation caused dramatic
price increases in food and fuel, and economic growth slowed to near zero by
the mid-1970s. 36 Vice President Spiro T. Agnew pled no contest to charges
of tax evasion and resigned,3 7 and then convictions in the Watergate cover-up
scandal led to President Nixon's resignation.38 As inflation soared through
the remainder of the decade, the expansion of the economy slowed and
economic productivity stopped growing, causing the nation to suffer from
"stagflation."' 9 The 1980s began with a failed U.S. military attempt to rescue
American hostages in Iran and the subsequent election of President Ronald
W. Reagan, 4 0 bringing with him a conservative realignment of federal
politics and social policy4' and a championing of supply-side economics 42
and deregulation.3 In 1985, President Reagan began his second term as
President, having won 49 of the 50 states in his reelection.44
Within this period of political and economic crises and changes, the
tax code went through significant changes, almost all aimed at reducing
revenue loss caused by aggressive tax planning. The Tax Reform Act of
1969 added a minimum tax on tax preferences, limited the deductibility of
hobby losses and investment interest, and restricted depreciation on real
estate.45 Congress's next step was the Tax Reform Act of 1976, which
created at-risk limitations for nonrecourse loans, limited prepaid expense
deductions, codified the "substantial economic effect" test for partnership
allocations, and added penalties for tax return preparers who neglected or
34. Id. at 570, 572.
35. Id. at 574.
36. Id. at 576, 578.
37. Id. at 574.
38. Id. at 576, 578.
39. W. ELLIOT BROWNLEE, FEDERAL TAXATION IN AMERICA: A SHORT
HISTORY 133 (2d ed. 2004) [hereinafter BROWNLEE, TAXATION IN AMERICA].
40. GRUN, TIMETABLES, supra note 30, at 594, 596.
41. Joseph P. Byrne, Reagan Revolution, in 2 THE EIGHTIES IN AMERICA
809 (Milton Berman & Tracy Irons-Georges eds., 2008).
42. M. Casey Diana, Supply-Side Economics, in 3 HISTORICAL
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN BuSINESS 809 (Richard L. Wilson ed., 2009).
43. R. Baird Shuman, Reaganomics, in 2 THE EIGHTIES IN AMERICA 809
(Milton Berman & Tracy Irons-Georges eds., 2008).
44. GRUN, TIMETABLES, supra note 30, at 608.
45. Garrison Grawoig DeLee, Abusive Tax Shelters: Will the Latest Tools
Really Help?, 57 S. CAL. L. REv. 431, 435 (1984) [hereinafter DeLee, Tax Shelters];
see also Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 301(a), 83 Stat. 487, 580
(codified as former I.R.C. § 56); § 213(a), 83 Stat. at 571 (codified as former I.R.C.
§ 183); § 221(a), 83 Stat. at 574 (codified as former I.R.C. § 163(d)); § 521(a), 83
Stat. at 649 (codified as former I.R.C. § 167(j)).
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intentionally disregarded the law. Only two years later in 1978, Congress
took additional aim at tax shelters, tightening the at-risk rules4 7 and reducing
the incentive for aggressive tax planning by significantly cutting capital
gains and business taxes.4 8 By the time President Reagan took office, the
success of many tax shelter investments depended on winning the so-called
audit lottery (i.e., escaping audit). 9
After President Reagan's election, Congress passed the Economic
Recovery Tax Act (ERTA) in 1981,so which lowered the maximum tax rate
for individuals and thus the incentive for tax sheltering,5' and also imposed
valuation penalties that increased the costs for many successfully challenged
tax shelters.52 The following year, Congress enacted the Tax Equity and
Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA),53 which was designed to
increase taxpayer compliance with tax law.5 4 It imposed a penalty on the
46. DeLee, Tax Shelters, supra note 45, at 437; see also Tax Reform Act of
1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 204(a), 90 Stat. 1520, 1531 (codified as former I.R.C. §
465); § 208(a), 90 Stat. at 1541-42 (codified as former I.R.C. § 46 1(g)); § 213(d), 90
Stat. at 1548 (codified as former I.R.C. § 704(b)(2)); § 1203(b), 90 Stat. at 1689-92
(codified as former I.R.C. § 6694(a)). A willful understatement of taxpayer liability
brought the preparer a $500 penalty for each instance. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub.
L. No. 94-455, § 1203(b)(1), 90 Stat. 1520, 1689 (codified as former I.R.C. §
6694(b)). Additionally, preparers were assessed penalties for: (1) failure to furnish a
copy of the return to the taxpayer, (2) failure to sign the return, (3) failure to furnish
his identifying number, (4) failure to retain a copy or list of prepared tax returns, (5)
failure of an employer of preparers to keep proper records, and (6) endorsement or
negotiation by the preparer of a check issued to the taxpayer relating to his taxes.
Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1203(f, 90 Stat. 1520, 1692
(codified as former I.R.C. § 6695). The 1976 Act also gave the Secretary of the
Treasury the authority to file an action in a district court against a tax preparer to
enjoin him from continuing to perform any of the conduct above, misrepresenting
his eligibility to practice before the Internal Revenue Service or otherwise
misrepresenting his experience or education as a tax return preparer, guaranteeing a
refund or allowance of a credit to a taxpayer, or engaging in any other fraudulent or
deceptive conduct that "substantially interfere[d]" with the administration of Internal
Revenue laws. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1203(g), 90 Stat.
1520, 1693 (codified as former I.R.C. § 7407).
47. DeLee, Tax Shelters, supra note 45, at 437.
48. BROWNLEE, TAXATION IN AMERICA, supra note 39, at 135; see also
Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L No. 95-600, § 402(a), 92 Stat. 2763, 2867 (codified as
former I.R.C. § 1202(a)); § 301(a), 92 Stat. at 2820 (codified as former I.R.C. §
11(a)).
49. BROWNLEE, TAXATION IN AMERICA, supra note 39, at 135.
50. Id. at 150; DeLee, Tax Shelters, supra note 45, at 445.
51. DeLee, Tax Shelters, supra note 45, at 445-46.
52. Id. at 446.
53. BROWNLEE, TAXATION IN AMERICA, supra note 39, at 154.
54. DeLee, Tax Shelters, supra note 45, at 447.
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promoters of abusive tax shelters, and it allowed the Secretary of the
Treasury to seek an injunction against such promoters. It created penalties
to discourage both understating tax liability and the aiding and abetting of
understating tax liability. 56 It imposed a penalty on taxpayers for a
"substantial understatement" of their income tax liability.57 And, in a direct
aim at the tax sheltering industry, TEFRA provided that if the
understatement of a tax liability was related to a tax shelter investment, the
penalty could only be avoided if the position had "substantial authority" and
the taxpayer had a reasonable belief that the tax treatment was "more likely
than not" the proper treatment. Two years later, Congress passed the
Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 (DEFRA),59 with specific curbs on the tax
shelter industry, including the registration of tax shelters, the maintenance of
lists of tax shelter investors, and changes in reporting obligations .60 By 1985,
the tax shelter investment landscape had been profoundly altered.
The tax code was not the only relevant law significantly reformed
between 1965 and 1985. The law of lawyering went through two significant
reforms. In 1969, the ABA adopted the Code of Professional Responsibility,
which replaced the thirty-two Canons of Ethics that had been in place since
55. Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248,
§ 320(a), 96 Stat. 324, 611 (codified as former I.R.C. § 6700).
56. DeLee, Tax Shelters, supra note 45, at 447.
57. Id. at 447-48; see also Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of
1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 323(a), 96 Stat. 324, 615 (codified as former I.R.C. §
6661(a)). Under TEFRA, a "substantial understatement" was the greater of ten
percent of the tax required to be shown on the return or $5000. Tax Equity and Fiscal
Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 323(a), 96 Stat. 324, 615 (codified
as former I.R.C. § 6661(b)(1)(A)).
58. DeLee, Tax Shelters, supra note 45, at 448. TEFRA added a new
section to the Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C. § 6661), which required that a tax
position taken have substantial authority and a reasonable belief by the preparer that
the treatment was proper to reduce an understatement of tax liability. Tax Equity and
Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 323(a), 96 Stat. 324, 615
(codified as former I.R.C. § 666 1(b)(2)(B)(i), (C)(i)(II)).
59. BROWNLEE, TAXATION IN AMERICA, supra note 39, at 155.
60. George Cooper, The Taming of the Shrewd: Identifuing and Controlling
Income Tax Avoidance, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 657, 688 (1985); see also Deficit
Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 14 1(a), 98 Stat. 494, 677-80 (codified
as former I.R.C. § 6111); § 142(a), 98 Stat. at 681 (codified as former I.R.C. §
6112); § 145(a), 98 Stat. at 684-85 (codified as former I.R.C. § 6050H); § 148(a), 98
Stat. at 687-88 (codified as former I.R.C. § 6050J); § 149(a), 98 Stat. at 689




1908.61 Like the Canons, this code was litigation-oriented, yet unlike the
Canons, it was quite complex organizationally. It had three tiers of guidance:
canons, ethical considerations, and disciplinary rules. Over the next few
years, the ABA was quite successful in convincing state and federal courts to
adopt the Code as law. Arguably, however, the code's only success was its
rapid adoption; its reign was quite short. Legal ethics had become a matter of
considerable public concern. The Watergate crisis prompted the public
spectacle of lawyers attempting to defend their conduct in "a wholly
unappealing fashion." In this antilawyer climate, the ABA established a
commission to devise new ethical standards to replace the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Although the Canons had lasted more than six
decades, a mere eight years after its adoption, the Code of Professional
Responsibility was slated for replacement."
The Model Rules of Professional Responsibility were adopted in
1983 as a wholesale replacement to the Code of Professional
Responsibility. 65 The Model Rules were a complete change in format,
organization, and language.66 The Model Rules replaced the duty of "zealous
representation" with duties of diligence and competence6 ' and explicitly
differentiated between the role of a lawyer as a "Counselor" or "Advisor"
and an "Advocate" with different rules for each role.6 ' But the Model Rules
were most distinctive in being black-letter rules as such. Unlike the Code,
there were neither canons nor ethical considerations. 70 There were only rules,
usually stated in the negative.7 The shift to the rules approach of the Model
Rules has been described as a shift from legal ethics to the "law of
lawyering." 72
61. RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN S. DZIENKOWSKI, LEGAL ETHICS: THE
LAWYER'S DESKBOOK ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY § 1-1(d) (2013-2014 ed.)
[hereinafter ROTUNDA & DzIENKOWSKI, LEGAL ETHICS].
62. Id.
63. Michael S. Ariens, American Legal Ethics in an Age of Anxiety, 40 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 343, 444 (2008) [hereinafter Ariens, American Legal Ethics]; see also
ROTUNDA & DzIENKOWSKI, LEGAL ETHICS, supra note 61, at v-vi.
64. ROTUNDA & DZIENKOWSKl, LEGAL ETHICS, supra note 61, at § 1-1(e).
65. Ariens, American Legal Ethics, supra note 63, at 449; ROTUNDA &
DzIENKOWSKi, LEGAL ETHICS, supra note 61, at § 1-1(e).
66. ROTUNDA & DZIENKOWSKI, LEGAL ETHICS, supra note 61, at § 1-1(e).
67. Id. at § 1-2.
68. Id. at § 2.1-1.
69. Ariens, American Legal Ethics, supra note 63, at 448; ROTUNDA &
DzIENKOWSKi, LEGAL ETHICS, supra note 61, at § 1-2.
70. ROTUNDA & DZIENKOWSKI, LEGAL ETHICS, supra note 61, at § 1-2.
7 1. Id.
72. Ariens, American Legal Ethics, supra note 63, at 444-52.
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Between 1965 and 1985, the political landscape changed
considerably, and so did the tax law and the legal ethics standards. With
respect to taxation, a series of congressional acts reduced the rates of taxation
and the opportunities for tax sheltering while increasing the penalties on
taxpayers and their advisors who unsuccessfully played the audit lottery.
And, as to legal ethics, the canons that had lasted for over 60 years were
replaced by a complex professional code, which itself was soon replaced by
professional rules-and by an explicitly legalistic approach to
professionalism. It is in this context of increasing taxpayer penalties and
increasing professional legalism that the 1965-1985 committees concerned
with legal ethics for tax lawyers undertook their tasks.
II. ABA COMMITTEES AND OPINIONS: 1965-1985
The years between 1965 and 1985 are bookended with Opinions on
legal ethics for tax lawyers issued by the ABA PR Committee. The 1965
Opinion 31473 was the first such Opinion ever issued, and the 1985 Opinion
85-35274 was its de facto replacement, altering the basic standard for tax
return advice. Neither Opinion was issued by the ABA Section on Taxation
(Tax Section), as it is the PR Committee that has the authority to issue formal
opinions on ethics standards. But the Tax Section prompted both Opinions
through its Committee on Standards of Tax Practice (Tax Standards
Committee). This committee had been created in 1962, being charged to
"ascertain what ethical problems . . . are peculiar to the tax field" and "to
raise the ethical level of practice" in the tax field.
A. Tax Standards Committee and Opinion 314
While the Tax Standards Committee had other goals, such as
determining whether or not tax lawyers should have their own canons of
ethics, its first priority was to concentrate on the application of the Canons to
tax lawyers. The desire for official clarification of standards by the bar had
73. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 314 (1965),
reprinted in 51 A.B.A. J. 671 (1965) [hereinafter Opinion 314].
74. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof I Responsibility, Formal Op. 85-352
(1985), reprinted in 39 TAx. LAW. 631 (1986) [hereinafter Opinion 85-352].
75. Chairman's Page, BULL. SEC. TAx'N, Apr. 1962, at 1, 3 [hereinafter
Chairman's Page, Apr. 1962].
76. Merle H. Miller, Report of the Special Committee on Standards of Tax
Practice, BULL. SEC. TAx'N, July 1963, at 267, 269, 274 [hereinafter Miller, Report
of the Special Committee, July 1963]; Merle H. Miller, Report of the Special
Committee on Standards of Tax Practice Presented at the Chicago Meeting, BULL.




been growing among tax lawyers." While tax lawyers had been debating
their duties and standards for over 20 years, there was still no consensus as to
how those duties and standards ought to be stated (though there was more of
a consensus as to what those meant in practice). There were doubts about
the application of the Canons to the nonlitigation roles of tax lawyers
because "almost all work on codes of ethics for attorneys has been based on
the concept of adversary actions before a trial court." 9 A further
complication in the minds of at least some tax lawyers was that lawyers
served in the Treasury Department bar and were subject to the practice
standards of its Circular 230 while practicing before the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS), which was a Treasury agency.8 In addition to the specific
duties they might owe, they debated whether they had a more general duty
that was relevant to their work and that precluded characterizing the IRS as a
mere adversary (at least outside litigation).8 ' Alongside this more general
77. The first such call seems to have been John M. Maguire's call for
"marching orders" in 1957. John M. Maguire, Conscience and Propriety in Lawyer's
Tax Practice, 13 TAX L. REV. 27, 47 (1957) [hereinafter Maguire, Conscience]. He
was joined a few years later by both the IRS Commissioner Mortimer M. Caplin's
and Sullivan & Cromwell's Norris Darrell's similar calls. Mortimer M. Caplin,
Responsibilities of the Tax Adviser-A Perspective, 40 TAXES 1030, 1031 (1962)
[hereinafter Caplin, Responsibilities of the Tax Adviser]; Norris Darrell, The Tax
Practitioner's Duty to His Client and His Government, 7 PRAc. LAW. 23, 39-40
(Mar. 1961) [hereinafter Darrell, Practitioner's Duty] (this article was based on
various addresses, including the N.Y.U. Institute on Federal Taxation in 1958, where
it was subsequently published); see also Hatfield, Legal Ethics, supra note 4 at 10-
11.
78. Hatfield, Legal Ethics, supra note 4, at 25-28.
79. Miller, Report of the Special Committee, July 1963, supra note 76, at
274.
80. Willkie Farr & Gallagher partner Thomas N. Tarleau argued that a tax
lawyer's special obligations followed from the lawyer being an enrolled member of
the Treasury Department's bar. Ethical Problems of Tax Practitioners: Transcript of
Tax Law Review's 1952 Banquet, 8 TAX L. REV. 1, 10 (1952) [hereinafter Ethical
Problems]; see also Hatfield, Legal Ethics, supra note 4, at 15-18; Maguire,
Conscience, supra note 77, at 45, 48; Miller, Report of the Special Committee, July
1963, supra note 76, at 267, 274.
81. New York University Professor Jerome Hellerstein argued that the
relationship between a citizen and the government is not comparable to that between
a defendant and plaintiff because the citizen owes "his government and his neighbors
the duty of paying his share of taxes," and that tax lawyers "owe to our Government
and to ourselves" to improve the tax morality of the community. Ethical Problems,
supra note 80, at 9 (statements by Jerome Hellerstein). Merle H. Miller argued that
tax lawyers had special obligations as American patriots. Merle H. Miller, Morality
in Tax Planning, 10 N.Y.U. ANN. INST. ON FED. TAX'N 1067, 1083 (1952)
[hereinafter Miller, Morality in Tax Planning]. Merle H. Miller was with the Office
of Chief Counsel of the Bureau of Internal Revenue prior to joining Ice Miller as a
684 [Vol. 15:9
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debate on the duties of taxpayers and tax lawyers to the system was a
specific-and perhaps more pressing-debate on whether there was a duty to
disclose "doubtful but arguable points in a tax return."82 This debate involved
duties of both lawyer and client,8 the requirements of Circular 230,84 the IRS
and Internal Revenue Code (Code), and the impact on the IRS of excessive
disclosure.
partner in 1940 and beginning the firm's federal tax practice. Jerry Crimmins, Ice,
Miller Celebrates Its 100th Anniversary, ICE MILLER L. BULL., Apr. 12, 2010,
http://www.icemiller.com/enewsletter/ICE.news/IM_100_Law Bulletin.htm [herein
after Crimmins, Ice Miller]. Harvard Professor John Maguire argued for a double
responsibility both to the client and the "public interest." Maguire, Conscience,
supra note 77, at 44-45; see also Hatfield, Legal Ethics, supra note 4. Former
American Law Institute president Norris Darrell described a duty "to help make our
self-assessing income tax system work." Norris Darrell, Conscience and Propriety in
Tax Practice, 17 N.Y.U. ANN. INST. ON FED. TAX'N 1, 2 (1959) [hereinafter Darrell,
Conscience and Propriety]; see also Hatfield, Legal Ethics, supra note 4, at 15-16,
50-52.
82. Norris Darrell argued for a general rule of disclosure for any item that
"might be considered taxable by the tax authorities," with the exception of those
situations in which "there were many courts decisions uniformly in his client's favor
but as to which the government bullheadedly simply hadn't yet given up." Norris
Darrel, Responsibilities of the Lawyer in Tax Practice, in BORIS I. BITTKER,
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY IN FEDERAL TAX PRACTICE 92 (1970) [hereinafter
BITTKER, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY]. In contrast, Professor Jerome Hellerstein
thought there was no duty to "recommend full and fair disclosure" where the lawyer
is "reasonably clear" that the Bureau would decide the issue adversely, but "not [as]
clear as to what the results will be in the courts." Ethical Problems, supra note 80, at
8 (statements by Jerome Hellerstein). Randolph Paul characterized this situation as
one where "many borderline problems constantly arise." Randolph E. Paul, The
Lawyer As a Tax Adviser, 25 ROCKY MNTN. L. REv. 412, 428 (1952) [hereinafter
Paul, Lawyer As Tax Adviser]; see also Hatfield, Legal Ethics, supra note 4, at 28-
30.
83. Indeed, both Professor Bittker and Professor Barnes thought the
disclosure issue should be resolved at the taxpayer level rather than the tax lawyer
level. Boris I. Bittker, Professional Responsibility in Federal Tax Practice, in
BITTKER, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 82, at 251; John Potts Barnes,
The Lawyer and the Voluntary Assessment System, 40 TAXES 1034, 1038 (1962); see
also Hatfield, Legal Ethics, supra note 4, at 31-32.
84. See, e.g., Mortimer M. Caplin, What Is Good Tax Practice: A Statement
of the Problem and the Issues Involved, 21 N.Y.U. ANN. INST. ON FED. TAX'N 9
(1963); Caplin, Responsibilities of the Tax Adviser, supra note 77, at 1033; Hatfield,
Legal Ethics, supra note 4, at 32.
85. Professor Bittker argued that neither the Regulations nor the Service
impose a general obligation of disclosure and, further, that a general obligation of
disclosure would burden the IRS tremendously as there would be "hundreds of
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With the hope that the right application of the Canons would provide
some resolution to the disclosure issues, the Tax Standards Committee
86
requested the PR Committee to opine. At the annual meeting in 1964, one
of the "highlight[s]" of the business was the briefing of the PR Committee on
three specific tax problems.17 Six tax lawyers made arguments to a panel of
PR Committee members. The three problems centered on the duty of
disclosure in different circumstances: planning, settlement negotiation, and
litigation. 8 9 The first problem raised the issue of whether a lawyer can advise
a client to take a position on the client's return when there is merely arguable
but "reasonable grounds" for interpreting the facts in a positive way and, if
so, whether or not the position needs to be disclosed.90 The second problem
asked whether a lawyer negotiating a settlement needs to disclose knowledge
thousands of riders" filed annually. Boris 1. Bittker, Professional Responsibility in
Federal Tax Practice, in BITTKER, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 82, at
252-53; see also Hatfield, Legal Ethics, supra note 4, at 31.
86. The option of seeking a ruling from the experts on the PR Committee
was contemplated in the Tax Standards Committee's first report. See Miller, Report
of the Special Committee, July 1963, supra note 76, at 275.
87. Chairman's Page, BULL. SEC. TAX'N, Oct. 1964, at 1, 3 [hereinafter
Chairman's Page, Oct. 1964].
88. Those making the arguments were Boris Kostelanetz, Jules Ritholtz,
Don V. Harris, Jr., David W. Richmond, Lipman Redmond, and Mitchell Rogovin.
Tom Arnold, Activities ofSections, 50 A.B.A. J. 1088, 1088 (1964). Merle H. Miller
was the one committee member who had written extensively on legal ethics for tax
lawyers, but he was not one of the lawyers making arguments to the PR Committee.
Interestingly, a review of the biographies of these exceptional lawyers who did make
the arguments reveals that more of them appear to have been litigators than advisors.
See Boris Kostelanetz, 94, Tax Defense Lawyer for the Notable, Dies, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 4, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/04/business/04kostelanetz.html?
r-O&adxnnl=1&adxnnlx=1391580183-2b5fThEsPLIJ8/jl4SpINg; Jules Ritholz,
68, Dies; New York Tax Lawyer, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 1993,
http://www.nytimes.com/1993/09/16/obituaries/jules-ritholz-68-dies-new-york-tax-
lawyer.html (American College of Trial Lawyers member and tax fraud specialist);
Don V. Harris Jr., Tax Lawyer, WASH. POST, June 4, 2011, http://articles.
washingtonpost.com/2011-06-04/local/35235145_Itax-lawyer-law-review-don-v-
harris (estate and corporate tax law specialist); Lipman Redman Dies at 78; Area Tax
Lawyer Since 1946, HIGHBEAM RES., Nov. 19, 1997, http://www.highbeam.com/
doc/IP2-751603.html (reposting a Washington Post obituary; co-author of treatise
on tax procedure); Mitchell Rogovin, 65, Civil Liberties Lawyer, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8,
1996, http://www.nytimes.com/1 996/02/08/nyregion/mitchell-rogovin-65-civil-
liberties-lawyer.html (counsel to the IRS and the Central Intelligence Agency).
89. Merle H. Miller & John H. Grosvenor, Jr., Report ofSpecial Committee
on Standards of Tax Practice, BULL. SEC. TAx'N, July 1964, at 269 [hereinafter
Miller & Grosvenor, Jr., Report of the Special Committee, July 1964].
90. Id.
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of prior deception to an auditing agent.9' The third problem questioned
whether a lawyer in Tax Court should disclose his9 2 client's deception. 9 3
Notwithstanding the PR Committee members having "difficulty with the full
import of some of the agreed facts,"94 there was a good discussion.9 At the
end of the day, the consensus among those PR Committee members
participating in the sessions was that the tax lawyer had a duty to disclose in
each of the situations discussed.
Despite the Tax Standards Committee seeking solution to these three
specific tax problems and providing an extensive briefing of the specific
problems, the PR Committee declined to address those specific problems.
Instead, the PR Committee (which had no tax lawyers on it) 9 7 chose to
articulate "general principles" for tax lawyers.98 These general principles
were expected to "make consideration of the specific problems moot."99 And
so it was that the PR Committee issued Opinion 314, the first ethics opinion
9 1. Id.
92. As noninclusive genders remained the norm throughout this period's
text, the usage is reflected in the descriptions of the text. What appears to be the first
gender inclusive language in the literature may be found in Gordon M. Weber,
Franklin C. Latcham & Joseph J. Hyde, The Responsibilities and Liabilities of Tax
Advisors, 29 MAJOR TAX PLAN. 605, 653 (1977) [hereinafter Weber et al., Tax
Advisors] ("A tax man or woman needs to know how to skate over thin ice. He or
she must be able to sense [these] difficulties . . . .").
93. Miller & Grosvenor, Jr., Report of the Special Committee, July 1964,
supra note 89.
94. Chairman's Page, Oct. 1964, supra note 87, at 3.
95. Id. While the issues may have seemed closed to the experts, the popular
press coverage of the sessions was strongly antidisclosure, dismissing what it
described as arguments about "patriotism" and, instead, characterizing the
government as "Big Brother;" and praising those lawyers who argued that calls for
disclosure were "pious" and "subversive of the American system of justice." The
Debate Between the Angels' Advocates (Government Lawyers) and the Devil's
Advocates (Taxpayer Lawyers), WASH. STAR (Gr. Brit), Sept. 12, 1964, reprinted in
Lester B. Snyder, Teaching Professional Responsibility in Tax Courses, 41 U. COLO.
L. REv. 336, 340-41 (1969) [hereinafter Snyder, Professional Responsibility].
96. Chairman's Page, Oct. 1964, supra note 87, at 3.
97. See James R. Rowen, When May a Lawyer Advise a Client That He May
Take a Position on His Tax Return?, 29 TAX LAW. 237, 245-46 (1976) [hereinafter
Rowen, Lawyer Advise] (Rowen notes apparent absence of a tax specialist, though
no means of certain verification).
98. Opinion 314, supra note 73, at 27.
99. Indeed, in the briefing itself, the members PR Committee expressed
"doubt" that the three specific problems would be addressed in a formal opinion,
instead expecting the "setting forth of general guidelines that would make
consideration of the specific problems moot." Chairman 's Page, Oct. 1964, supra
note 87, at 3.
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to address tax lawyers. 00 The Opinion was brief. The only issue it addressed
was the potential conflict between the tax lawyer's duty of zealousness for
the client's cause and the tax lawyer's duty of loyalty to the courts.'o' Given
that the IRS is not a court (or even quasi-judicial), the Opinion concluded
that the IRS must be nothing other than a "brother lawyer" to the tax lawyer
and, as such, not owed any special duties.10 2 The tax lawyer is simply his
client's advocate against an adversary. 0 3 Negotiations with the IRS were not
ethically different than the negotiation of any civil dispute.10 4 So long as "the
client's case is fairly arguable, a lawyer is under no duty to disclose its
weaknesses, any more than he would be to make such a disclosure to a
brother lawyer."' 05 And as to advising a client on tax return positions, the tax
lawyer "may freely urge the statement of positions most favorable to the
client as long as there is a reasonable basis for those positions." 06 There is
100. The PR Committee had published opinions involving the practice of
tax law, but these were related to the unauthorized practice of law by certified public
accountants and the dual practice of law and accounting by lawyers who were also
certified public accountants. In 1961, the CPE issued Ethics Opinion 297, which
prohibited a lawyer-accountant from practicing both. The following year, Opinion
305 took the position that those who are both lawyers and accountants are not
entitled to hold themselves out only as accountants but still engage in the practice of
law. Maintaining the division between lawyers and accountants was foremost in the
mind of at least some members of the ABA. Ariens, American Legal Ethics, supra
note 63, at 436. A Special Committee on Professional Relations considered the
relationship between the accounting and lawyering professions, issuing many reports
and recommendations. Interestingly, the topic was not found in the Tax Section
Committee reports but was rather a generalized concern about the unauthorized
practice of law. See, e.g., American Bar Association Report of the Special Committee
on Professional Relations, UNAUTHORIZED PRAC. NEws, Dec. 1955, at 32. At the
time, Dean Erwin Griswold (Harvard Law School) characterized the situation as the
"two great professions of law and accountancy [being] squared away for a battle
royal." Erwin N. Griswold, Role ofLawyer in Tax Practice, 10 MAJOR TAX PLAN. 1,
1 (1958) (commenting on the consequence of the Agran case creating strife between
lawyers and accountants). In 1957, the ABA Special Committee on Professional
Relations and the Committee on Relations with the Bar of the American Institute of
Accountants established the National Conference of Lawyers and Certified Public
Accountants to deal with the tensions. Report of the Special Committee on
Professional Relations, 82 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 491, 492 (1957) (including the Joint
Report of the Special Committee on Professional Relations of the American Bar
Association and Committee on Relations with the Bar of the American Institute of
Accountants).
101. Opinion 314, supra note 73, at 28, 31.
102. Id.
103. Id
104. Id. at 30.
105. Id. at 31.
106. Id at 30.
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no duty in those situations for the lawyer to "advise that riders be attached to
the client's tax return explaining the circumstances surrounding the
transaction or the expenditures."'0 The authors of the Opinion did allow that
"prudence" and "tactical" considerations might also be considered but that
disclosures, as such, were not ethically required. 0 8
One wonders if the members of the PR Committee understood the
controversial nature of its Opinion, or if the short form and simple reasoning
of the Opinion evidences committee members believing the matters to be
nearly self-evident. The committee's "general principles"-that the IRS is
merely an adversary to whom no special duties are owed and against whom
one advocates for one's client, and that no disclosure is required for tax
return positions with a "reasonable basis"-had not been self-evident to the
tax lawyers debating the issues for 20 years.1 09 The Opinion was also at odds
with the tentative, prodisclosure conclusions expressed by the panel
members who participated in the briefing by the Tax Standards Committee.
Unlike its detailed response to the PR Committee's revision of
Opinion 314 20 years later," 0 the Tax Standards Committee had no follow
up discussion on the original Opinion 314. In four sentences, the Tax
Standards Committee's report following the Opinion's publication "marked
the receipt" of the Opinion, provided citations to its full text, and noted that it
had "received considerable favorable comment.""' Curiously, there is almost




109. The characterization of the relationship as adversarial was also at odds
with the description of the cooperative relationship provided by the IRS
Commissioner to the Tax Standards Committee. The relationship of tax lawyers with
the IRS had been addressed by the then-IRS Commissioner, Mortimer M. Caplin, in
what was considered as one of the highlights of the committee's annual meeting. The
Commissioner described the relationship between tax lawyers and the government in
terms quite different than Opinion 314 would. For the Commissioner, the
relationship was to be cooperative: "The effectiveness of our tax system rests upon .
. . cooperation between [tax lawyers and the government] in reaching fair and proper
results; . . . in attaining decent and reasonable tax administration; . . . [and] in
meeting our responsibilities as practitioners, taxpayers and citizens." Miller, Report
of the Special Committee, Jan. 1964, supra note 76, at 39.
110. See infra Part II.C.
111. Boris Kostelanetz, Report of Special Committee on Standards of Tax
Practice, BULL. SEC. TAx'N, July 1966, at 124 [hereinafter Kostelanetz, Report of
the Special Committee, July 1966].
112. The only other contemporaneous acknowledgment appears to be the
report of the Wyoming State Bar Committee for Liaison with the Internal Revenue
Service, which encouraged members of the bar to read the opinion, saying "[iut is
significant with respect to the relationship between the representatives of the Internal
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B. Tax Bar Responds to Opinion 314
There appears to have been virtually no published mention of the
Opinion for at least three years,' 13 and so, perhaps, it is not too surprising
that when University of Connecticut School of Law Professor Lester B.
Snyder polled 200 Connecticut lawyers for a 1969 article, "none of the
lawyers questioned was aware of Opinion 314."l 4 However, by 1974, almost
a decade after its issuance, in a bibliography of the materials accumulating
on professional responsibilities in tax practice, the Opinion was listed along
with Circular 230, the two being described as "two brief but important
charters of conduct with members of' the IRS."' In that same year, N.Y.U.
Tax Institute's Henry Sellin"6 cited the Opinion as evidence that the
reasonable basis standard reflected the consensus of tax lawyers." 7
Revenue Service" and tax lawyers. Report of the Wyoming State Bar Committee for
Liaison with the Internal Revenue Service, 1 LAND & WATER L. REv. 643, 645
(1966). In his 1966 article, Mr. Comeel makes no mention of the Opinion, even
though he considers ethical issues for tax lawyers. Frederic G. Corneel, Tax
Planning: Teaching and Practice, 22 TAX L. REv. 221 (1967) [hereinafter Corneel,
Tax Planning Teaching].
113. The first sustained discussion appears to be Marvin K. Collie &
Thomas P. Marinis, Jr., Ethical Considerations on Discovery of Error in Tax
Returns, 22 TAx LAw. 455, 455 (1969) [hereinafter Collie & Marinis, Ethical
Considerations]. As Mr. Collie was Chairman of the Special Committee on
Standards of Tax Practice, perhaps this was an effort to raise awareness of the
Opinion. Committee Activities, 22 TAx LAW. 209, 228 (1969). Mr. Collie made clear
that "writings on ethical practices by reputable" tax lawyers were one of the three
sources of standards of conduct for tax lawyers along with the Canons and written
standards of state and local bar associations such as Opinion 314. Collie & Marinis,
Ethical Considerations, supra, at 461. Indeed, he made liberal use of the writings of
those tax lawyers. See id at 455 n.1, 462 nn.22-24, 463 n.27, 464 n.28, 465 n.31.
114. Snyder, Professional Responsibility, supra note 95, at 338.
115. Other resources listed included Frederic G. Comeel, Ethical
Guidelines for Tax Practice, 28 TAX L. REv. 1, 8 (1972) [hereinafter Comeel,
Ethical Guidelines], and the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility (both listed
ahead of Opinion 314), as well as Professor Boris Bittker's PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY IN FEDERAL TAX PRACTICE (1970), supra note 82 (an anthology
comprised primarily of pre-Opinion 314 articles), and the AICPA Code of
Professional Ethics. Harry K. Mansfield, Report of the Committee on Standards of
Tax Practice, 27 TAX LAW. 581 (1974) [hereinafter Mansfield, Report of the
Committee, 1974].
116. Mr. Sellin was the director of the New York University's Annual
Institute on Federal Taxation from 1947 until 1972, when he retired. Henry Sellin,
N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 1985, http://www.nytimes.com/1985/05/04/nyregion/henry-
sellin.html.
117. Henry Sellin, Professional Responsibility of the Tax Practitioner, 52
TAXES 584, 593 (1974) [hereinafter Sellin, Professional Responsibility]. He also
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About this same time, analyses of Opinion 314's reasonable basis
standard became more common, usually with the commentators trying to
improve its reasoning, even if accepting its conclusions. Perhaps the first to
do this was Sullivan & Worcester's Frederic G. Corneel in his seminal article
on tax practice guidelines. He gave several reasons to accept the reasonable
basis standard."'8 He pointed out that it was the same standard used by
certified public accountants (CPAs)" 9 and that it was consistent with some
recent (nontax) court cases on sufficiency of counsel at trial. 120 He also
argued that it is only "permitting execution of returns which may be wrong
so long as they are not known to be wrong" that allows the testing of
doubtful questions, which "could otherwise be tested only by claims for
refund."' 2' The reasonable basis standard also was more practical than a
standard that required a more specific weighing, as it is "easier to say there is
a respectable argument" than to say no contrary argument outweighs or that
the argument has some quantifiable chance of success on the merits. 122
Like Frederic Comeel, Shearman & Sterling's James R. Rowen tried
to improve the rationale for the reasonable basis standard. He asked, "Is there
a proper rationale for Opinion 314?"123 He thought it likely that "aggressive
taxpayers will ultimately pay substantially less than their share of the tax
burden" because lawyers are able to advise positions that have a reasonable
basis,124 even though they think it "would probably be decided against the
[client] if the government raised the issue."l 25 At the time that Opinion 314
was issued, the Canons were governing. Mr. Rowen argued that, under the
Canons, there was no support for the reasonable basis standard. Indeed, he
believed the appropriate standard under the Canons was that a return position
should represent "what [the lawyer] conscientiously believes to be [the
law's] just meaning and extent."l 2 6 He considered whether or not the
standard could be justified under the ABA Code of Professional
cited the relevant American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA)
standard as to the consensus of certified public accountants. Apparently, he
considered the standards relevant due to their reflecting the consensus of the
professionals rather than the formal opinions of the professional associations.
118. Comeel, Ethical Guidelines, supra note 115, at 7-9.
119. Id. at 8. The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
(AICPA) expressed it as "reasonable support" rather than "reasonable basis." Id. at 8
n.22.
120. Id. at 8 n.23.
121. Id. at 8.
122. Id. at 8-9.
123. Rowen, Lawyer Advise, supra note 97, at 240.
124. Id. at 244.
125. Id. at 243.
126. Id. at 246.
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Responsibility (PR Code), which had been adopted in 1969.127 He concluded
that, under the PR Code, the reasonable basis standard would be appropriate
if the return is "regarded as like a submission in an adversary proceeding."1 2 8
But he argued that a return is not like such a submission. 129 Ultimately, he
believed that the standard was to be justified not in terms of legal ethics, but
in light of the taxpayer's legal obligation.13 0 The taxpayer was required to
sign under penalties of perjury that the return was "to the best of my
knowledge and belief . . . true, correct, and complete."' 3 ' As a practical
matter, in light of policies "behind the privilege against self-incrimination"
and the legal standards for perjury, and so as not to deny "the opportunity to
litigate doubtful questions," Mr. Rowen concluded that a taxpayer ought to
be able to sign the return with favorable positions that have a reasonable
basis.132 And the lawyer ought to be able to so advise. While he thought the
reasonable basis standard could be justified along these lines, Mr. Rowen
still thought it unjustly affected the administration of the tax laws.'13 To
remedy this, he considered several alternatives, including a change to
Opinion 314 or Congress imposing a standard on tax lawyers.134 However,
he settled on Congress imposing a penalty on taxpayers when an
underpayment is attributable to certain undisclosed positions., 35 He added
that a taxpayer ought to be able to escape the penalty so long as he
establishes that "he did not have reason to believe that the item was of a type
that required disclosure."' 36 But, he wrote, "[T]he standards for avoiding the
penalty should be tighter than the obtaining of a 'reasonable basis'
opinion."3
In the same year that James Rowen sought to defend Opinion 314's
reasonable basis standard, John S. Nolan took aim at it, placing it in the
context of the audit lottery and concluding that a "greater burden of
objectivity" than the reasonable basis standard should be placed on taxpayers
and their advisers.' 38 He suggested a change in the standards imposed by
Congress, thinking the issue better addressed by law than ethics. He
suggested the Code require more disclosure-that return preparers certify
127. Id.
128. Id at 248.
129. Id. at 255.
130. Id. at 250.
131. Id
132. Id at 255-56.
133. Id. at 260.
134. Id. at 262.
135. Id at 262-63.
136. Id. at 263.
137. Id.
138. John S. Nolan, Audit Coverage and Private Tax Planning, 37 NAT'L
TAX J. 425, 428 (1974) [hereinafter Nolan, Audit Coverage].
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that there was no undisclosed exclusions or deductions "as to which
substantial doubt exists as to the correctness"-and a revision of the penalty
structure for negligence and fraud. 139 He also suggested that Congress
require the IRS to take only audit positions with a reasonable basis, and that
as a matter of policy, the IRS should adopt "a position favorable to the
taxpayer where differing interpretations of the law are possible and there is
substantial support, both in terms of policy and equity, for the position
favorable to the taxpayer."1 40
After the 1976 anti-tax shelter legislation was enacted,141 the
criticism of Opinion 314's reasonable basis standard increased. Some argued
that there was a tension between the reasonable basis standard and the new
penalty for disregarding rules, with the former allowing "somewhat more
aggressive" positions than the latter.142 Others were concerned that the
reasonable basis standard allowed taxpayers knowingly to take positions that
were questionable, and thus benefit from the audit lottery, arguing that the
solution might be requiring taxpayers to report more information on their
returns.14 3 It was suggested that the IRS impose a standard based on Opinion
314's but require "disclosure where the taxpayer does not in good faith
believe he has the better of the argument." 44
By 1978, the Tax Standards Committee began considering whether
the reasonable basis standard should be modified.145 There was agreement
that the standard allowed "many incorrect returns [to be] filed" without being
"flagged" and thereby "go largely undetected." 4 6 Even though Opinion 314
139. Id. at 430.
140. Id. at 431.
141. See supra Part I.B.
142. David W. Santi, Comment, Legal Liability of the Professional Tax
Practitioner, 26 EMORY L.J. 403, 427-28 (1977) [hereinafter Santi, Legal Liability].
143. Discussion of "Questionable Positions," 32 TAx LAW. 13, 17-21, 23-
27 (1978) [hereinafter Questionable Positions] (panel discussion with IRS
Commissioner Jerome Kurtz and attorneys William H. Smith, Mac Asbill, Jr., and
Harry K. Mansfield at an ABA Section of Taxation meeting on May 20, 1978).
144. This was the comment of Harry K. Mansfield at a panel discussion on
questionable positions. It was unclear how he related the reasonable basis standard to
one that would require disclosure when the taxpayer did not in good faith believe he
had the better of the argument. It is unclear what he meant by having the better of the
argument; perhaps it was a good faith belief that the taxpayer would be more likely
than not to succeed on the merits if the issue were litigated. He considered it to be an
issue of "individual conscience[]." However, he proposed the standard be coupled
with the return having a schedule of 100 questions related to transactional facts. Id.
at 27.
145. Frederic G. Corneel, Report of the Committee on Standards of Tax
Practice, 32 TAx LAW. 933, 933-34 (1979) [hereinafter Corneel, Report of the
Committee, 1979].
146. Id. at 934.
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established the reasonable basis standard for return preparation and
technically was silent on tax planning, the committee report noted that "a
good number of lawyers" believed that since they could file reasonable basis
returns that were probably incorrect, they could advise clients to "engage in
transactions that involve taking such very doubtful positions." 147 At least
some of the members of the committee disagreed with this, believing that, at
least with respect to tax shelter offerings, no position should be advised
"unless there is a substantial likelihood that the tax position" would be
sustained.148 The committee charged Goodfellows & Eells' Paul J. Sax 49 to
prepare an article on tax shelter opinions.'o In that article, he argued that the
reasonable basis standard of Opinion 314 only applied to return positions,
not planning advice.15 1 With respect to returns, the lawyer takes "the facts as
he finds them" and claims a position, functioning principally as an
advocate.152 When functioning as an advisor, however, the lawyer has
different duties, including the duty "to work within the tax system rather than
to attack it" and the duty to predict the outcome. s3
In 1982, a special committee of the Bar of the City of New York,
with its own membership divided in the debate, summarized the arguments
for and against the formal reconsideration of Opinion 314.14 The arguments
for reconsideration focused on the new accuracy-related penalties enacted as
part of the anti-tax shelter legislation in 1982 and the need to work with other
professional groups in considering the standard."' Those arguing against
reconsideration said that, with respect to other advice that might exploit the
audit lottery, "it is for Congress rather than the organized bar" to set the
standard.' 56 As to the new 1982 penalties, these committee members
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Paul J. Sax is senior counsel and a retired partner of the San Francisco
office of Orrick, Herrington, and Stutcliffe (previously Goodfellows & Eells), which
he joined in 1969 and became a partner in 1975. He received his J.D. from the
University of California, Hastings College of Law, and his LL.M. in Taxation from
New York University. Paul J. Sax, SACRAMENTO ST. C. Soc. SCi. & INTERDISC.
STUD., last accessed July 29, 2013, http://www.csus.edu/ssis/for-community/
inductees/academysax.html.
150. Corneel, Report ofthe Committee, 1979, supra note 145, at 933-34.
151. Paul J. Sax, Lawyer Responsibility in Tax Shelter Opinions, 34 TAX
LAW. 5, 37-38 (1980) [hereinafter Sax, Shelter Opinions].
152. Id. at 37.
153. Id. at 38.
154. The Lawyer's Role in Tax Practice, 36 TAx LAW. 865, 883-884
(1983). The new penalties were on both taxpayers (then-I.R.C. § 6661) and advisers
(then-I.R.C. § 6701).
155. Id. at 883-84.
156. Id. at 884.
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emphasized that Congress had not imposed requirements of either
"substantial authority or disclosure" on the advisers, but only provided for
penalties on advisers who "know" their advice would result in an
understatement.'5 ' Thus, they concluded, the reasonable basis standard
should not be reconsidered, especially when "no better or more acceptable
ethical standard has been advanced." 158
Outside the confines of a committee, some critics focused on the
relevance of the new 1982 penalty regime,159 while others took aim at the
Opinion's most fundamental term, "reasonable basis," and its lack of
definition.160 As Emory Law Professor Ray Patterson put it, "A poor lawyer
is he who cannot find a reasonable basis for his client's position."' The
reasonable basis standard, he wrote, was a "classic primer for rationalizing
unethical conduct" and, as such, was "morally enervating."' 62 The "sin" of
Opinion 314-'[h]eads I win, tails you lose"--reflected the premise that the
IRS is an adversary, not just for practical purposes, but "in a theoretical sense
. .. of promulgating standards of conduct."' 6 3 This premise puts the issues as
rights to be protected rather than duties to be performed, and when combined
with conceiving the lawyer's role always to be an advocate and the only legal
process to be judicial, leads to Opinion 314's reasonable basis standard.164
However, as the argument against Opinion 314 went, because lawyers serve
many roles and the relevant legal process is not a judicial process but rather
an administrative one in which the client has duties (not just rights), Opinion
314's foundations were irremediably flawed. 6 5 Twenty years after its
issuance, Opinion 314 had almost no defenders. 66
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Marvin J. Garbis, The Tax Professional and the New Tax Compliance
Environment, 29 WM. & MARY TAX CONF. 9, 10-11 (1983) [hereinafter Garbis, Tax
Professional].
160. Dean Marsan, Tax Shelter Opinions: Ethical Responsibilities of the
Tax Attorney, 9 OHIO N.U. L. REv. 237, 241 (1982) [hereinafter Marsan, Ethical
Responsibilities].
161. L. Ray Patterson, Tax Shelters for the Client-Ethics Shelters for the
Lawyer, 61 TEX. L. REv. 1163, 1165 (1983) (reviewing BERNARD WOLFMAN &
JAMES P. HOLDEN, ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN FEDERAL TAX PRACTICE (1981))
[hereinafter Patterson, Tax Shelters].
162. Id at 1166.
163. Id at 1167.
164. Id. at 1169-70.
165. Id. at 1169-1170,1176.
166. Venable, Baetjer & Howard's Jacques T. Schlenger and John B.
Watkins V did write a provocative article focused on the "Treasury's relentless
march" to regulate tax shelter opinions. In the article, the authors devote a lengthy
footnote (but only a footnote) to defending Opinion 314, saying its standard would
not justify exploiting the audit lottery, but then, continuing, they add, "One cannot
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C. Revising Opinion 314
In February 1984, the Tax Section convened to discuss proposing a
revision of Opinion 314 to be closer to the 1982 taxpayer understatement
penalty, which required either "substantial authority" or disclosure to avoid
the penalty.16 The formally proposed revision being discussed used a
"substantial basis" rather than the statutory "substantial authority" standard
out of concerns for the technical definition of substantial authority.168
Harvard Law Professor Bernard Wolfman-who claimed the reasonable
basis standard meant any advice you could articulate without laughing-
argued for a direct connection between the professional and statutory
standards, but there was little support for equating the two. 69
After considering comments, the Tax Standards Committee formally
proposed that the Tax Section support a revision of Opinion 314.'70 The
proposal was accepted by an "overwhelming majority" of the Tax Section
members in the business session.' 7 ' The proposal cited several reasons for
revision. There had been substantial changes in the bar's ethical standards
since 1965, and differing standards adopted according to the role of the
lawyers as adviser, intermediary, evaluator, or advocate.172 The reasonable
basis standard had been construed to support "the use of any colorable claim
to justify the exploitation" of the audit lottery, and the consequent problems
had already led to new laws (including a new understatement penalty),
proposed revisions to Circular 230, and the issuance of Opinion 346
addressing lawyers' tax shelter opinions. 73 Although Opinion 314 was
avoid being amused by the latest shallow, chic 'intellectual analytical' tool, the
'audit lottery,' the 'digit lottery,' the 'health lottery,' ad nauseam-life, tax or
otherwise does favor or disfavor" because (indirectly quoting President Kennedy)
"life is rough and unfair, not because there is a correctable or unavoidable
conspiracy or fault." Exactly what their defense of Opinion 314 was is quite unclear,
but they clearly opposed revising it. Jacques T. Schlenger & John B. Watkins V,
Exploring the Myths of Circular 230, 62 TAXES 283, 283 n.2 (1984).
167. Lee A. Sheppard, Ethics Opinion 314 and Tax Shelters Addressed at
ABA Meeting, 22 TAX NOTES 757 (Feb. 27, 1984).
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Paul J. Sax, James P. Holden, Theodore Tannenwald, Jr., David E.
Watts & Bernard Wolfman, Report of the Special Task Force on Formal Opinion
85-352, 39 TAX LAW. 635, 635 (1986) [hereinafter Sax et al., Report of the Special
Task Force].
171. Id.
172. ABA Section of Taxation Proposed Revision to Formal Opinion 314,
May 21, 1984, reprinted in BERNARD WOLFMAN & JAMES P. HOLDEN, ETHICAL
PROBLEMS IN FEDERAL TAX PRACTICE 71 (2d ed. 1985).
173. Id.
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limited to the standards for return positions, the Tax Section Committee
proposed that tax planning advice should be no lower than the revised return
position standard. 17 4 In proposing its revision, the Committee began with the
premise that "[a] tax return is not a submission in an adversary proceeding,"
but rather serves a "disclosure and assessment function," and thus "must
provide a fair report of matters affecting tax liability."' 75 It proposed
requiring a good faith duty in giving advice, which required the advice to be
"meritorious" as "evidenced by a practical and realistic possibility of
success, if litigated."' 76 If the lawyer thought it unclear that a return position
met this standard, then "requisite good faith may be shown by adequate
disclosure in the taxpayer's return." 77
Having received the proposal from the Tax Section, the following
year the PR Committee (which unlike the Opinion 314 committee did
include tax lawyers) 78 issued Opinion 85 -3 52 .179 The PR Committee
minimized the role that the reasonable basis standard played in the audit
lottery, writing that it was "not universally held" that such occurred, and that
in any event, the Committee did not believe that a proper interpretation and
application of the standard would permit it. 180 However, the PR Committee
concluded that, since there had been what it described as "serious
controversy .. . and persistent criticisms by distinguished members of the tax
bar and IRS officials, and members of Congress," the standard ought to be
restated. The Tax Section had cited the reactions to the abuses of the
reasonable basis standard as new federal statutes and regulations, which the
PR Committee did not mention when it referenced the "persistent criticisms"
by "IRS officials and members of Congress." Both the PR Committee and
the Tax Section cited changes in professional standards as relevant, but they
gave different reasons. The Tax Section had emphasized that the changes in
professional standards had reflected varying roles of lawyers, the PR
Committee said the changes were relevant as the new standards did not refer
to "reasonable basis" when addressing the duty of a lawyer in arguing for a
position. The Tax Section proposed that the tax planning standard should be
no lower than return position advising standards, but the PR Committee
made no mention of the relationship. Whereas the Tax Section characterized
return preparation as nonadversarial, the PR Committee did not, emphasizing
174. Id.
175. Id. (when an audit commences, the process becomes adversarial,
according to the Committee).
176. Id. at 73.
177. Id.
178. The committee included two tax lawyers. Dennis J. Ventry, Jr.,
Raising the Ethical Bar for Tax Lawyers, Why We Need Circular 230, 111 TAX
NOTES 823, 829 (May 15, 2006).




instead that the return "may be the first step in a process that may result in an
adversary relationship."'' Considering the lawyer's basic duties to
"zealously and loyally. . . represent the interest of the client," a lawyer "may
advise [a] reporting position . .. where the lawyer believes the position
probably will not prevail." 82 The lawyer could do this, even if there were
neither substantial authority nor disclosure, so long as the "lawyer in good
faith believes [the position] is warranted in existing law or . . . by a good
faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law." 83
This, the PR Committee concluded, "requires that there is some realistic
possibility of success if the matter is litigated." 84 While this conclusion was
consistent with the Tax Standards Committee's conclusion, the Tax Section
had not cited the duty of zealous representation and had framed the
conclusion in the context of the nonadversarial nature of return preparation.
D. Responding to Opinion 85-352
Given the differences between the Tax Section's and the PR
Committee's approaches (which some characterized as the PR Committee's
rejection of the Tax Section's proposal),' 85 the Tax Section appointed a
Special Task Force to examine the PR Committee's new Opinion and "how
it will apply to tax practice."' 6 The Task Force's report noted that Opinion
85-352 did not take into consideration the various roles of tax lawyers and
that it did not address negotiation and settlement roles ("which continue to be





185. The draft of the Opinion, it was said, "could be read to have rejected
the standard proposed by the Section of Taxation and to have restated a low
minimum standard of tax reporting. The net effect . . . likely would be business as
usual, and we fear that the American Bar Association would be subjected to
widespread criticism on the ground that it has condoned practices that been
condemned by the Treasury and the Congress." Theodore C. Falk, Tax Ethics, Legal
Ethics, and Real Ethics: A Critique of ABA Formal Opinion 85-352, 39 TAX LAW.
643, 644 n.8 (1986) (citing Letter from James B. Lewis, Chairman, ABA Section of
Taxation, to Robert 0. Hetledge, ABA Ethics Committee (June 4, 1985)). Opinion
85-352 is "an advance from Opinion 314. It improves the ethical climate in which to
practice tax law and probably has some positive effect on the 'audit lottery' problem.
But it stops short of what it could and should do." Wolfman Recalls History of
Circular 230, Suggests What Should Constitute Substantial Authority, 1987 TAX
NOTES TODAY 30-24 (Feb. 13, 1987).
186. Sax et al., Report of the Special Task Force, supra note 170, at 635.
187. Id. at 636.
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tax planning advice, though the Task Force argued that the Opinion's
standards for return preparation ought to apply to advising as well.
Concerned that some might infer tax shelter opinions were exempted from
the Opinion's "realistic possibility of success," the Task Force took the
position that this was the minimal standard for all tax advice. The Task Force
considered the equation of good faith with the objective standard of a
"realistic possibility of success," suggesting that, in pursuit of some
uniformity, the Treasury Department might adopt the same standard in
Circular 230 and urge Congress to do likewise for the return preparer
penalty. As to the substance of the new standard, the Task Force opined that
"good faith" had to be determined without regard to the chance of audit
(which the PR Committee had not made explicit), and that a one-third chance
of success should be satisfactory, as should a position with substantial
authority. If the standard was not met, disclosure was not an alternative,
though an advance payment of the tax and a suitably detailed claim for
refund would be. 18 As to whether or not tax returns were adversarial, the
Task Force emphasized that the new Opinion did not "suggest that tax
returns are adversarial," but only that some (aggressive) returns "may result
in an adversary relationship."l 89 For its part, the Task Force restated the
approach of the Tax Section that a tax return is not an adversarial filing, but
rather it is a "citizen's report to the government," which serves a "disclosure,
reporting, and self-assessment function."1 9 0
III. TAx SHELTERS AND TREASURY DEPARTMENT REGULATION:
1965-1985
The history of Opinion 314 and the issuance of Opinion 85-352 is
not the only substantial tax lawyer ethics story in 1965-1985. As significant
as these ABA Opinions are, it may be that the larger story is actually
Treasury's foray into regulating tax lawyers as part of the anti-tax shelter
crackdown. While Treasury eventually followed the ABA's lead on the
appropriate standards for the bar, the years between making clear its
intention to regulate the bar in 1980 and its 1984 acceptance of the ABA's
standards as its own were years of ongoing debate among the bar members as
not only to the appropriate ethics standards for tax lawyers, but also the
relevance of statutory and regulatory standards for both lawyers and their
taxpayer clients.
188. Id. at 638-39.




A. Revising Circular 230 to Regulate Tax Shelter Opinions
When Jerome Kurtz was appointed IRS Commissioner by the newly
elected President Jimmy Carter in 1977,191 he left private tax practice in
Philadelphia, bringing a specific agenda with him to D.C.'92 He wanted to
inspire public confidence that the administration of the tax law did not favor
the wealthy.' 9 His target was to reduce the playing of the audit lottery,
which he believed many wealthy taxpayers were winning with abusive tax
shelter positions that were never audited.19 4 This increased inequities in the
tax system. He contrasted abusive tax shelters with appropriate shelters,
which admittedly reduced "the equity of the tax system by reducing the taxes
... of upper income taxpayers," but for nonabusive shelters, Congress had
decided this was a "tolerable side effect of a special tax provision" to
encourage particular investments.195 Abusive tax shelters were the ones in
which the loss of equity was not offset by intended greater benefits and that,
accordingly, decreased the fairness of and respect for the tax system.196 Even
though both Congress and the IRS had been fighting abusive tax shelters, the
Commissioner said that new leaks sprung as soon as the known ones "in the
dike [were] plugged."197
In a 1980 speech to the Securities Regulation Institute, Treasury
General Counsel Robert H. Mundheim expanded the anti-tax shelter
campaign to tax opinions, which he described as "one of the critical elements
in promoting" abusive tax shelters.198 He explained the promotional value of
tax opinions, saying that the "theory is that the tax opinion . . . provides the
191. In Washington, 55 TAXES 367 (1977).
192. James S. Byrne, Kurtz Sets Reform Agenda for IRS, 5 TAx NOTEs 3, 3
(June 6, 1977) [hereinafter Byrne, Reform Agenda].
193. Id
194. Id. at 5. He also wanted to encourage greater participation of the tax
bar in providing expert comments on proposed regulations. "I think it is unfortunate
that many lawyers feel constrained by their client representation (from expressing)
privately held views," he said. "I don't think it is necessary, and I think we would
have a better tax system if the people who really understood the technical issues
would come forward and state their views." Id at 4.
195. Jerome Kurtz, Commissioner's Remarks on Abusive Tax Shelter
Issues, 55 TAxEs 774, 774 (1977) [hereinafter Kurtz, Commissoner's Remarks].
196. Id
197. Id. Initially, his efforts were aimed at increasing audits (and increasing
the use of computerized applications), rulings, and disclosures. Byrne, Reform
Agenda, supra note 192; Kurtz, Commissioner's Remarks, supra note 195, at 775-
78; Questionable Positions, supra note 143, at 17, 25.
198. Robert H. Mundheim, Mundheim on "Abusive Tax Shelters," 10 TAX
NOTES 213, 213 (Feb. 18, 1980) [hereinafter Mundheim, Abusive Tax Shelters]. Mr.
Mundheim's speech on abusive tax shelters and the need for the bar to respond was
delivered before the Securities Regulation Institute, not the tax bar.
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investor assurance that a negligence or fraud penalty will not be assessed
even if [the tax benefits] are disallowed."' 99 If protected from the fraud
penalty, even if the tax benefits are disallowed, the time value of the deferral
of the increased tax liability "will generally protect the investor from losses
on the shelter." 20 0 Tax lawyers, he concluded, were not fulfilling their
professional responsibility with these opinions, and the solution was to
restrain "the unprofessional conduct of tax lawyers" who provided them.20 1
He commended the Tax Standards Committee for formulating its
"Guidelines to Tax Practice" 202 that suggested a firm not assist with tax
shelters unless there was a "substantial likelihood" that the tax benefits
would be sustained.2 03 But he strongly urged the bar to issue a formal opinion
on tax shelter opinions, specifically citing the "confusing signals" from
Opinion 314's reasonable basis standard for preparation of individual
returnS204 and adding that "if an appropriate response is not forthcoming, we
[at Treasury] may be forced to act."20 s He identified four types of opinions
that required action: the false opinion ("false or totally incompetent"), the
assumed facts opinion ("disclaim[ing] knowledge of the accuracy of the
facts"), the nonopinion ("never relate[s] the law to the [relevant] facts"), and
the negative opinion ("reasonable basis but you'll probably lose").20 6
Even before Mr. Mundheim's speech, the Tax Standards Committee
had begun working on the ethical problems related to tax shelters, beginning
by "collecting examples of particularly smelly offerings for review,"20 7 and
199. Id. at 214.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. Interestingly, he limited the application of Opinion 314 to return
preparation, which technically was its scope, though the implication was accepted
that the standard for return preparation determined the standards for advice as well.
Opinion 314 begins by referring to practicing before the Internal Revenue Service.
Opinion 314, supra note 73. However, Opinion 314 later provides that a lawyer is
under a duty not to mislead the IRS deliberately and affirmatively, either by
misstatements, silence, or permitting his client to mislead "with regard both to the
preparation of returns and negotiating administrative settlements." Opinion 85-352,
supra note 74.
203. Guidelines to Tax Practice: Report of the Committee on Standards of
Tax Practice, Section of Taxation, American Bar Association, 31 TAX LAW. 551, 554
(1978) [hereinafter Guidelines to Tax Practice].
204. Mundheim, Abusive Tax Shelters, supra note 198, at 214.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Frederic G. Corneel, Committee on Standards of Tax Practice, 32 TAX
LAW. 531 (1979) [hereinafter Comeel, Committee Report, 1979]. In 1973, the
committee had taken opinions as their principal focus, specifically studying due
diligence, disclaimers, and disclosure to the IRS, with the objective of forming some
guidelines. Harry K. Mansfield, Committee on Standards of Tax Practice, 27 TAX
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studying the propriety of "tax shelter package plans" in which a lawyer
charges a single fee that covers the planning and execution of a transaction as
well as the representation of the client before the IRS upon audit and
litigation.20 8 In 1979, the Committee had worked with securities lawyers to
prepare a program (including a skit) on tax shelter offerings and professional
responsibility. 20 9 A subcommittee was working on a proposal for tax shelter
opinions.2 0 After Mr. Mundheim's challenge, both the Tax Section and the
NYSBA Tax Section also began to work on standards for tax shelter
opinions.21
Even though Mr. Mundheim had suggested there would be time for
the bars to respond, and even though they had begun, the Treasury
Department itself proposed rules on tax shelter opinions in September 1980,
only seven months after his speech.2 12 The proposal was to amend Circular
230. The proposal's release repeated Mr. Mundheim's explanation of the use
of opinions as penalty insurance and his identification of four problematic
opinion types.213 However, it added that the bar was concerned with these
opinions as they "put significant and unhealthy pressure" on careful
practitioners (either in the form of being offered a high fee for "an
elaborately qualified" opinion, "which the practitioner knows another will
give if he or she does not," or the "unpleasant task" of explaining to a client
who invested in a tax shelter that, despite there being an opinion from
LAW. 319 (1974); Carl A. Stutsman, Jr., Report of the Committee on Standards of
Tax Practice, 26 TAx LAW. 616 (1973). In 1978, the committee did publish some
guidelines for practice (which Mr. Mundheim commended in his 1980 speech).
Guidelines to Tax Practice, supra note 203, at 554.
208. Hart H. Spiegel, Committee on Standards of Tax Practice, 30 TAX
LAW. 538 (1977). The committee had begun analyzing the professional
responsibility problems raised by tax opinions as early as 1972. Carl A. Stutsman,
Jr., Committee on Standards of Tax Practice, 26 TAx LAw. 346 (1973).
209. Comeel, Report ofthe Committee, 1979, supra note 145.
210. James B. Lewis, Report of the Committee on Standards of Tax
Practice, 33 TAX LAW. 1083 (1980) [hereinafter Lewis, Report of the Committee,
1980].
211. Tax Section, N.Y. State Bar Ass'n, Circular 230 and the Standards
Applicable to Tax Shelter Opinions, 12 TAx NOTES 251, 261 (Feb. 9, 1981)
[hereinafter N.Y. State Bar Ass'n, Circular 230]; Statement on Proposed Rule
Amending Circular 230 with Respect to Tax Shelter Opinions, 34 TAX LAW. 745,
748 (1981) [hereinafter Statement on Proposed Rule Amending Circular 230]
(comments of the ABA Section of Taxation).
212. The proposals had been urged by the Commissioner's Advisory group
at its June 9, 1980 meeting. Tax Shelters; Practice Before the Internal Revenue
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another lawyer, the "tax benefits promised . . . cannot properly be taken").2 14
The only opinions regulated were those that would be part of offering
materials distributed to nonclients in "connection with the promotion of a tax
shelter." 2 15 "Tax shelter" was defined as a transaction "in which the claimed
tax benefits are likely to be perceived by the taxpayer as the principal reason
for his or her participation."2 16 In general, the proposal was that the lawyer
"exercise due diligence in representing the facts and Federal tax aspects,"
and in assuring the opinion was accurately described in the offering
materials. 2 17 The only type of opinion permitted was one concluding that it
was "more likely than not that the bulk of the tax benefits . . . promoted are
allowable under the tax law."218 Violations of these standards could lead to
disbarment or suspension from practice before the IRS.219
Not surprisingly, the proposed revisions to Circular 230 generated
considerable comment and debate, the vigor of which impeded the
finalization of the changes to Circular 230. It was not until 1984 that Circular
230 was finally revised.220 In the years between the proposal and finalization,
two significant events in 1982 remade the tax shelter opinion landscape.
The first was the PR Committee issuing Opinion 346221 on tax
shelter opinions, which the final revisions to Circular 230 in 1984 would
generally follow. Opinion 346 prohibited false opinions.22 2 It required the tax
lawyer to make the same factual inquiries a securities lawyer is required to
make; that is, neither an audit of the facts nor accepting "as true that which
he should not reasonably believe to be true."223 It required the lawyer to
"relate the law to the actual facts" to the extent known.2 24 Thus it addressed
the first three types of opinions targeted by Treasury. It did not require a
more likely than not conclusion, however, but rather did require that, if
possible, the lawyer should opine as to "the probable outcome on the merits






219. Id. at 58,598.
220. Regulations Governing the Practice of Attorneys, Certified Public
Accountants, Enrolled Agents, and Enrolled Actuaries Before the Internal Revenue
Service, 49 Fed. Reg. 6719 (Feb. 23, 1984) (codified at 31 C.F.R. Subtitle A, pt. 10
(1984)).
221. See infra Part I.C.
222. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof'I Responsibility, Formal Op. 346






reasonable certainty" the IRS would challenge the tax benefit.2 2 5 If such a
prediction is not possible, or if the prediction is that benefits "probably will
not be realized," then full explanation and disclosure is required.226 Unlike
Treasury's focus on the intention of the tax shelter investor in its definition,
the PR Committee defined tax shelters by explicitly excepting a list of
investments (e.g., municipal bonds), but generally providing that a tax shelter
was an investment that has as a "significant feature" deductions or credits in
excess of income from the investment or tax attributable to it which would
offset income or taxes from other sources.227
The second significant event also occurred in 1982. Anti-tax shelter
legislation passed, including a penalty on taxpayers, which required
substantial authority for undisclosed tax positions on returns, but the penalty
could be avoided if there was a reasonable basis for the taxpayer to believe
that the position was more likely than not to prevail. 2 2 8 This meant that the
problematic opinions targeted by the IRS-including negative opinions
permitted by Opinion 346-would no longer provide "penalty insurance,"
which was the problem the Treasury had sought to solve.
Treasury finalized its revisions to Circular 230 only after the 1982
issuance of Opinion 346 and the new penalty regime. 22 9 The final revisions
to Circular 230 differed from Opinion 346 in some technical ways, but the
Treasury followed the PR Committee's standards in the most important
ways.230 Most significantly, despite their proposed prohibition, Circular 230
allowed negative opinions (with explanation and disclosure) so long as they
225. Id.
226. Id. The sanctioning of negative opinions (with disclosure) was a
significant change from an earlier version of Opinion 346, which was quickly
withdrawn and replaced with this revised one. The earlier version did not permit
negative opinions. For a critical discussion, see Patterson, Tax Shelters, supra note
161, at 1177-79.
227. Opinion 346, supra note 222.
228. Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248,
§ 323(a), 96 Stat. 324, 613 (codified at I.R.C. § 6661). A "substantial
understatement" was defined as the greater of ten percent of the tax required to be
shown on the return or $5000. Id. (codified at I.R.C. § 6661(b)(1)(A)).
229. Regulations Governing the Practice of Attorneys, Certified Public
Accounts, Enrolled Agents, and Enrolled Actuaries Before the Internal Revenue
Service, 49 Fed. Reg. 6719 (Feb. 23, 1984) (codified at 31 C.F.R. Subtitle A, pt. 10
(1984)).
230. Treasury followed Opinion 346 by stating that a lawyer does not have
to independently audit the facts provided by the client unless the lawyer "has reason
to believe that any relevant facts asserted to him/her are untrue." Id. at 6722; see also
William A. Falik, Standards for Professionals Providing Tax Opinions in Tax
Shelter Offerings: An Analysis of the Treasury's Final Circular 230 Regulations and
a Comparison to ABA Formal Opinion 346, 37 TAx LAW. 701, 704 (1984)
[hereinafter Falik, Standards for Professionals].
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were "correctly, fairly and clearly described in the offering materials."23 1 The
debate on negative opinions had been largely mooted by the 1982 penalty
regime changes.232 The statute ended the opinions' usefulness to taxpayers,
thereby ending the temptation for taxpayer clients and their lawyers.
B. Debating Tax Shelter Opinions
Before these 1982 changes (Opinion 346 on tax shelter opinions and
the new statutory penalties) paved the way for Circular 230's final revisions
in 1984, the debates over the initial proposal consumed much of the tax bar's
attention. The tax bar tended to agree that abusive tax shelters were a
problem because they allowed investors to exploit the audit lottery, cost
revenue, increased administrative burdens, and undermined the integrity of
the tax system.233 The prevailing opinion was that the success of tax shelter
investors in turn reduced overall compliance.234 Abusive tax shelters were
231. Regulations Governing the Practice of Attorneys, Certified Public
Accountants, Enrolled Agents, and Enrolled Actuaries Before the Internal Revenue
Service, 49 Fed. Reg. 6719, 6720 (Feb. 23, 1984). With the new penalties for
abusive tax shelters under TEFRA, Treasury apparently agreed with the ABA that
negative opinions would become a rare occurrence. Falik, Standards for
Professionals, supra note 230.
232. Falik, Standards for Professionals, supra note 230, at 703; Mark J.
Gimenez, Tax Shelter Opinions-Securities and Tax Liabilities after TEFRA, 35
BAYLOR L. REV. 25, 42-43 (1983) [hereinafter Gimenez, Securities and Tax
Liabilities]; John Andre LeDuc, The Legislative Response of the 97th Congress to
Tax Shelters, the Audit Lottery, and Other Forms of Intentional or Reckless
Noncompliance, 18 TAX NOTES 363, 367 (1983) [hereinafter LeDuc, The Legislative
Response].
233. See, e.g., Kurtz, Commissioner's Remarks, supra note 195;
Practitioners Attack Limits on Tax Shelter Opinions, 11 TAX NOTES 1143 (Dec. 8,
1980); Laurence Goldfein & Stanley Weiss, An Analysis of the Proposed Changes
under Circular 230 Affecting Tax Shelter Opinions, 53 J. TAX'N 340, 346 (1980)
[hereinafter Goldfein & Weiss, Proposed Changes]; Sax, Shelter Opinions, supra
note 151, at 5, 37-38; Statement on Proposed Rule Amending Circular 230, supra
note 211; Gerald J. Robinson, Attacking Tax Shelters-IRS in Blunderland?, 12 TAX
NOTES 646 (1981) [hereinafter Robinson, Blunderland]; George A. Page, Jr., Tax
Shelter Opinions of Counsel: Association Criticizes Treasury Proposal, BOSTON B.
J., Feb. 1981, at 6, 7 (1981) [hereinafter Page, Tax Shelter Opinions]; Marsan,
Ethical Responsibilities, supra note 160, at 245. But see Jacques T. Schlenger,
Comments on the Proposed Regulations on Tax Shelter Opinions, 59 TAXES 173,
174, 181 (1981) [hereinafter Schlenger, Comments on Proposed Regulations]
(criticizing the anti-tax shelter campaign).
234. See, e.g., Kurtz, Commissioner's Remarks, supra note 195; Sax,
Shelter Opinions, supra note 151; LeDuc, The Legislative Response, supra note 232.
2014] 705
Florida Tax Review
described as absurd, outrageous, threatening, and fraudulent. 2 35 Some also
argued that abusive shelters also caused problems for tax lawyers who had
both incentives to facilitate the investments for promoters and the duties to
disappoint clients with a negative analysis of the investments.23 6 There was
concern that individual lawyers' involvement in these shelters cost the bar in
terms of its public perception. 237 Several noted that lawyers' self-interest in
preserving their individual professional reputations, 238 especially including
any avoiding liability under the securities laws (either to the Securities
Exchange Commission (SEC) or investors),2 39 ought to chill their
participation in abusive tax shelters. Most argued that writing abusive tax
shelter opinions was already inconsistent with the bar's professional
standards, which most agreed already required not merely a declaration of a
reasonable basis for claiming the tax benefits, but a prediction of the
outcome if the benefits were challenged2 40 and a refusal to exploit the audit
lottery.241
There was considerable agreement that tax shelters were a problem
but also considerable agreement that "the right lines simply ha[d] not been
Mr. LeDuc described this as the prevailing opinion but questioned its empirical
grounding.
235. Sax, Shelter Opinions, supra note 151, at 5; Roscoe L. Egger,
Warning: Abusive Tax Shelters Can Be Hazardous, 68 A.B.A. J. 1674, 1674-75
(1982).
236. The Treasury Department described this as a significant concern of the
bar when it proposed revising Circular 230. Tax Shelters; Practice Before the
Internal Revenue Service, 45 Fed. Reg. 58,594, 58,595 (Sept. 4, 1980) (codified at
31 C.F.R. pt. 10).
237. Page, Tax Shelter Opinions, supra note 233, at 7.
238. See, e.g., James B. Lewis, Lawyers' Ethical Responsibilities in
Rendering Opinions on Tax Shelter Promotions, 12 TAX NOTES 795, 797 (Apr. 13,
198 1) [hereinafter Lewis, Ethical Responsibilities].
239. See, e.g., Weber et al., Tax Advisors, supra note 92, at 613; Sharon
Burrell, Legal Malpractice of the Tax Attorney, 34 TAx EXECUTIVE 259, 270-71
(1982) [hereinafter Burrell, Legal Malpractice]; Gimenez, Securities and Tax
Liabilities, supra note 232, at 25-28, 42-43, 46.
240. See, e.g., Corneel, Ethical Guidelines, supra note 115, at 25;
Guidelines to Tax Practice, supra note 203, at 554; Goldfein & Weiss, Proposed
Changes, supra note 233, at 343; Sax, Shelter Opinions, supra note 151, at 5, 35,
37-38; Statement on Proposed Rule Amending Circular 230, supra note 211, at 745-
46; N.Y. State Bar Ass'n, Circular 230, supra note 211, at 261-62. The role of
prediction in legal opinions was a topic of greater interest during this time. See
Detlev F. Vagts, Legal Opinions in Quantitative Terms: The Lawyer as Haruspex or
Bookie?, 34 Bus. LAW 421 (1979).
241. See, e.g., Sax, Shelter Opinions, supra note 151, at 37-38; Statement
on Proposed Rule Amending Circular 230, supra note 211, at 745-46; N.Y. State
Bar Ass'n, Circular 230, supra note 211, at 261-62.
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drawn" in Treasury's 1980 proposal to revise Circular 230.242 The proposed
provisions and definitions were criticized as imprecise and unworkable 243:
The tax shelter definition was too broad and not objective,244 and the more
likely than not standard was too subjective and not always appropriate.24 5
The due diligence requirements were too burdensome 2 46 or, at the least, not
the same as what the SEC required.247 And several argued that sometimes,
surely, a limited opinion with a disclosure of its limitations was better than a
prohibition on limited opinions.24 8 Some criticized the proposal as too
ambitious, as it was higher than any existing legal or ethical duty. 249 The last
point was Paul Sax's in the article he prepared for the Tax Standards
Committee on tax shelter opinions,250 which along with the Tax Section's
report on Treasury's proposals, made essentially the same points about the
technical shortcomings.25 1
Many predicted the 1980 proposals would be counterproductive if
implemented without change. One substantial limitation identified by Paul
Sax, the Tax Section, the Tax Committee of the Boston Bar Association
(Boston Tax Committee), and others was that, by the definitions of Circular
230, it only applied to those who practiced before the IRS. As a result, many
242. James B. Lewis, The Treasury's Latest Attack on Tax Shelters, 11 TAX
NOTES 723, 724 (Oct. 13, 1980) [hereinafter Lewis, Treasury Attacks Tax Shelters];
James P. Holden, Practice Rules: Valid Response to Tax Shelter Abuse, LEGAL
TIMES WASH., Nov. 17, 1980, at 14 [hereinafter Holden, Valid Response].
243. Lewis, Treasury Attacks Tax Shelters, supra note 242; N.Y. State Bar
Ass'n, Circular 230, supra note 211, at 252.
244. Practitioners Attack Limits on Tax Shelter Opinions, supra note 233;
Statement on Proposed Rule Amending Circular 230, supra note 211, at 746;
Thomas Volet, Circular 230 and the Definition of a Tax Shelter, 12 TAX NOTES 949
(Apr. 27, 1981); Marsan, Ethical Responsibilities, supra note 160, at 246-47.
245. Practitioners Attack Limits on Tax Shelter Opinions, supra note 233;
Statement on Proposed Rule Amending Circular 230, supra note 211, at 746.
246. Practitioners Attack Limits on Tax Shelter Opinions, supra note 233.
247. Statement on Proposed Rule Amending Circular 230, supra note 211,
at 746; Kim Masters, Bar Groups Hit Tax Shelter Proposals, LEGAL TIMES WASH.,
Dec. 1, 1980, at 4 [hereinafter Masters, Bar Groups]. However, some objected to
using SEC standards on the theory that tax and securities lawyers played very
different roles. Goldfein & Weiss, Proposed Changes, supra note 233, at 342.
248. See, e.g., Goldfein & Weiss, Proposed Changes, supra note 233, at
342.
249. Sax, Shelter Opinions, supra note 151, at 40; Lewis, Ethical
Responsibilities, supra note 238, at 797.
250. The article began as part of the Tax Standards Committee's review of
"smelly" tax shelter offerings. Corneel, Report of the Committee, 1979, supra note
145; Sax, Shelter Opinions, supra note 151, at 5.
251. Sax, Shelter Opinions, supra note 151, at 37-46; Statement on
Proposed Rule Amending Circular 230, supra note 211, at 746-50.
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opinion-writing lawyers could (and already did) choose not to be involved in
representing their clients in IRS administrative matters, and so these lawyers
252
would not be subject to the new opinion restrictions. Jacques T. Schlenger
(Venable, Baetjer & Howard (Venable)) made this point as well, but he also
argued that as the lawyers who were not involved in practice before the IRS
were actually less qualified to opine that those who were, the proposal would
result in less-competently-drafted opinions. 253 Mr. Sax and others argued that
"Gresham's Law" 25 4 would apply such that careful tax lawyers who were
concerned with their duties would be replaced by careless lawyers who were
not, rather than risk the damage of even an unjustified disciplinary
proceeding.25 5 Those willing to give shoddy opinions would get the work.256
Both the Tax Section and the Boston Tax Committee predicted that, since
opinions were only required in certain securities offerings, tax lawyers would
become less involved in structuring tax shelters, as promoters simply opted
to forgo their opinions.2 57 And what opinions were drafted would be more
complex and difficult for investors to understand, which surely was not what
Treasury intended, as some critics pointed out. 258 Worse yet, with respect to
those willing to write abusive tax shelter opinions, the promoters could better
252. Sax, Shelter Opinions, supra note 151, at 45; Statement on Proposed
Rule Amending Circular 230, supra note 211, at 747; Page, Tax Shelter Opinions,
supra note 233, at 9.
253. Schlenger, Comments on Proposed Regulations, supra note 233, at
180.
254. Explicit mention of Gresham's Law having a similar effect precedes
the tax shelter discussion in the tax ethics literature. See, e.g., Sidney I. Roberts,
Wilbur H. Friedman, Martin D. Ginsburg, Carter T. Louthan, Donald C. Lubick,
Milton Young & George E. Zeitlin, A Report on Complexity and the Income Tax, 27
TAX L. REV. 325, 331 (1972) [hereinafter Roberts et al., Complexity] (report from
the New York State Bar Association, Tax Section, Committee on Tax Policy);
Nolan, Audit Coverage, supra note 138, at 430. Gresham's Law is an economic
principle that states where two forms of currency have identical face values, the
currency with the lower commodity value will be used as currency, while the other
with the higher commodity value will be hoarded or exported, and disappears from
circulation. See Gresham's Law, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA ONLINE, last accessed
Jan. 6, 2014, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/245850/Greshams-law.
Over time, Gresham's Law has been simplified as "bad money drives out good." Id.
255. See, e.g., Sax, Shelter Opinions, supra note 151, at 45; Goldfein &
Weiss, Proposed Changes, supra note 233, at 345; Gimenez, Securities and Tax
Liabilities, supra note 232, at 46.
256. Timothy N. Vettel, Circular 230 Exposure Draft Is Expected Soon, 17
TAx NOTES 561 (Nov. 15, 1982) (statement of William L. Raby, Chairman, The
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants).
257. Statement on Proposed Rule Amending Circular 230, supra note 211,
at 747; Page, Tax Shelter Opinions, supra note 233, at 9.
258. Goldfein & Weiss, Proposed Changes, supra note 233, at 342.
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market the opinions by "proudly proclaim[ing] that they 'comply with the
new rules."'259 Thus, the critics argued, the new rules would leave the
opinion-writing field to the less ethical and the less competent who would
write more-complex opinions and benefit from claiming that their opinions
were IRS-compliant. Clearly, this would be counterproductive.
Although there was significant agreement on the line-drawing
problems in Treasury's 1980 proposals, and even on the chances that
proposal would be counter-productive, the bar was divided on the most
fundamental issue: whether or not to support Treasury's general approach.
For example, the Tax Section and The Association of the Bar of the City of
New York (City Bar Association) supported it, while the Tax Section of the
New York State Bar Association (NYSBA Tax Section) and the Boston Tax
Committee did not.260 There was a substantive legal issue as to whether the
Treasury Department's authority to regulate those who practiced before the
IRS on the basis of character and competency was sufficient to legalize its
regulation of tax shelter opinion writing. Many doubted it did.26 1 Venable's
Jacques Schlenger made the most forceful argument against the legality of
the regulations, saying that a "fair and truthful opinion based on a careful
study" could not negatively reflect on a lawyer's character, reputation, or
competency, so such an opinion could in no way subject a lawyer to
discipline by the Treasury, even if it did not comply with Circular 230's
262
requirements for an opinion. The more common view was that Treasury
did have the legal authority to implement the proposed regulations, at least so
long as some adjustments to the regulations were made, such as making
259. Robinson, Blunderland, supra note 233.
260. Masters, Bar Groups, supra note 247; Statement on Proposed Rule
Amending Circular 230, supra note 211, at 746; Practitioners Attack Limits on Tax
Shelter Opinions, supra note 233; Committee Report: Proposed Amendments to
Circular 230 with Respect to Tax Shelter Opinions, 36 REC. Ass'N B. CITY N.Y. 133
(1981) (report of the Association's Committee on Taxation); Tax Committee of
Boston Bar Association, Treasury Lacks Authority; Page, Tax Shelter Opinions,
supra note 233. The City Bar explicitly accepted the right of agencies such as the
IRS to regulate specialists, and studying how such agency regulation fit with bar
regulation was the premise of the report on the lawyer's role in tax practice. Special
Comm. on Lawyer's Role in Tax Practice, Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y., The
Lawyer's Role in Tax Practice, 36 TAx LAw. 865, 865 (1983). Even before the
proposals, a Tax Section representative had stood against an ABA professional
discipline committee proposal opposing the discipline of lawyers by the federal
agencies before which they practiced. Lewis, Report of the Committee, 1980, supra
note 210.
261. See, e.g., Practitioners Attack Limits on Tax Shelter Opinions, supra
note 233; Page, Tax Shelter Opinions, supra note 233, at 8.




discipline dependent upon willfully violating Circular 230263 or failing to
make a full disclosure of the prediction of success, even if it did not meet the
proposed more-likely-than-not standard.2 6
The greater debate was not as to the outer legal limits on Treasury's
authority to regulate tax lawyers but rather whether Treasury ought to try.
The NYSBA Tax Section argued that Treasury's obvious conflict of interest
in regulating tax lawyers would not only chill advice,2 65 but "pose[d] an
incipient threat to the right of American citizens to be represented by
independent counsel-a matter far more fundamental and important than the
topic of tax shelters."26 6 Many individual lawyers echoed this sentiment,267
characterizing it as "inherently dangerous,"2 68 a compromise of the
adversarial process,2 69 and an undermining of the legal profession. 2 70 Along
these lines, Jacques Schlenger argued not only that the lawyer's role is to
serve his client's interest rather than Treasury's, but that Treasury's
proposals undermined the bar in a way he described as "sow[ing] the seeds
for government abuse of power."27 1 Making a similar point but in more-
directly-political terms, Dallas tax lawyer Mark Gimenez (Shank, Irwin &
Conant) wrote:
When the government becomes bored with regulating
airplanes, trucks and railroads, and begins regulating
lawyers, the American legal system will soon follow the
airplanes, trucks and railroads into "bankruptcy." The legal
263. Goldfein & Weiss, Proposed Changes, supra note 233, at 344. Some,
however, argued that the Treasury Department clearly had the statutory authority,
even without such adjustments. Lewis, Treasury Attacks Tax Shelters, supra note
242, at 725.
264. Statement on Proposed Rule Amending Circular 230, supra note 211,
at 746.
265. N.Y. State Bar Ass'n, Circular 230, supra note 211, at 252.
266. Id.
267. Incoming Treasury Letters: Proposed Regulations on Tax Shelter
Opinions Said to Threaten Adversary System, 11 TAX NOTES 1009 (Nov. 24, 1980)
[hereinafter Proposed Regulations Threaten Adversary System]; Masters, Bar
Groups, supra note 247; Alan Parnes, Tax Shelters, in EVALUATING TAX SHELTER
OFFERINGS 301-02 (Alan S. Rosenberg ed., PLI Tax Law & Practice Course
Handbook Series No. 155, 1981) [hereinafter Parnes, Tax Shelters]; Marsan, Ethical
Responsibilities, supra note 160, at 254-55.
268. Lewis, Treasury Attacks Tax Shelters, supra note 242, at 725.
269. Proposed Regulations Threaten Adversary System, supra note 267.
270. Incoming Letters: Attorney Defends Profession Against Proposed
Amendments to Rules on Tax Shelter Opinions, 11 TAX NOTES 743 (Oct. 13, 1980)
[hereinafter Attorney Defends Profession].
271. Schlenger, Comments on Proposed Regulations, supra note 233, at
180.
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system will be bankrupt when it loses its most important
asset: the principle that when a lawyer speaks, he speaks for
one, and only one, person-his client. When the government
interposes itself between a lawyer and his client, an
irreconcilable conflict arises. A lawyer cannot zealously
represent his client when he's worried about the . . . IRS
assessing a penalty against him. The . . . tax laws should be
concerned with . . . collecting taxes . . . and not with
regulating lawyers; that responsibility should remain with
the lawyer's peers and clients.272
To the contrary, in his Tax Standards Committee article, Paul Sax
rejected the argument that the 1980 proposals were illegitimate due to
undermining the adversarial role of the lawyer, pointing out that a lawyer
writing an opinion is not serving in the role of an adversary but the role of an
adviser, a distinction then made in the bar's ethics rules.273 Laurence
Goldfein and Stanley Weiss274 argued that the "proposals are not a threat to
the right of counsel, as some have suggested," as they do not apply if the
opinion is only given to the client; it is only the dissemination of the opinion
to nonclient investors that trigger the proposed requirements.275 And, the
proposals are reasonable because these nonclient investors do not have the
opportunity to discuss the opinion with the lawyer, and thus may not
understand it,2 76 and because there is a conflict of interest between the client
(promoter) and the nonclient investors (and the requirements are intended to
prevent the lawyer from glossing over weaknesses in order to induce
217investment). Even though it is was within Treasury's discretion, Paul Sax
counseled that Treasury's caution and restraint in these matters was prudent
to increase confidence in Treasury's regulation.278 Similarly, Laurence
Goldfein and Stanley Weiss, the Tax Section, and the City Bar suggested the
272. Gimenez, Securities and Tax Liabilities, supra note 232, at 46.
273. Sax, Shelter Opinions, supra note 151, at 44.
274. Laurence Goldfein served as editor of the Journal of Taxation and
serves as special counsel to the EisnerAmper accounting firm in its New York office.
He received his J.D. from New York University and his LL.M. from Georgetown
University. Laurence Goldfein, EISNERAMPER, last accessed Jan. 6, 2014,
http://www.eisneramper.com/about-us/professional-directory/Laurence-
Goldfein.aspx. Stanley Weiss is a Certified Public Accountant and the President and
Director of Weiss, Sugar, Dvorak & Dusek, a Chicago-based accounting firm.
Stanley H. Weiss, WEISS, SUGAR DVORAK & DUSEK, last accessed Jan. 6, 2014,
http://www.wsdd.com/team.html.
275. Goldfein & Weiss, Proposed Changes, supra note 233, at 341.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Sax, Shelter Opinions, supra note 151, at 44.
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use of private lawyers in Treasury's disciplinary process.2 79 But at least one
commentator thought Treasury was too cautious and restrained in its
proposals, suggesting that only a more radical approach would work,
specifically applying the proposed opinion requirements to all nonabusive
tax shelters and disciplining any lawyer who wrote an opinion for an abusive
tax shelter, regardless of the opinion's contents, the lawyer's process, or the
circumstances.
While the bar was divided over Treasury's foray into opinion
regulation, most agreed that Treasury should have provided more time for
bar associations to respond "to the challenge given them" in 1980 by
Treasury's Robert Mundheim.2 81 There was a call for Treasury to provide
more time to the bar2 82 or to include a sunset provision so that the regulations
would phase out as state bar associations implemented plans to discipline
lawyers for abusive tax shelter plans. 28 3 However, even if self-regulation was
the ideal, not all supported more practical opportunities for the bar to act.
James Holden (Steptoe & Johnson) said the appeals for more time for the bar
to act would be more impressive if the bar "had in fact been clamoring to
take action ,284 and Donald Alexander (Morgan, Lewis & Bockius) argued
that, rather than there being fifty bar associations with fifty rules, "a national
rule makes the best sense."
Others also suggested national approaches-but different ones-
premised on the regulation of tax lawyers being an inadequate response to
the tax shelter problem. One proposal was for Treasury to significantly
increase audits of tax shelters, especially those with lawyers in the habit of
giving objectionable opinions, as well as increasing criminal prosecutions.2 86
There was also a call for Congressional action rather than agency action, but
not so much through substantive changes in the tax law, which tended to be a
step behind the ingenuity of tax planners.2 87 Many, including Paul Sax in his
279. Goldfein & Weiss, Proposed Changes, supra note 233, at 344;
Statement on Proposed Rule Amending Circular 230, supra note 211, at 748.
280. Robinson, Blunderland, supra note 233.
28 1. Lewis, Treasury Attacks Tax Shelters, supra note 242, at 724.
282. N.Y. State Bar Ass'n, Circular 230, supra note 211, at 261.
283. Practitioners Attack Limits on Tax Shelter Opinions, supra note 233;
Marsan, Ethical Responsibilities, supra note 160, at 254.
284. Holden, Valid Response, supra note 242.
285. Masters, Bar Groups, supra note 247.
286. See, e.g., Parnes, Tax Shelters, supra note 267; N.Y. State Bar Ass'n,
Circular 230, supra note 211, at 262. "The ABA Tax Section played an important
role in the development of the partnership audit provisions" after the 1982 anti-tax
shelter legislation. LeDuc, The Legislative Response, supra note 232, at 367.
287. Lester B. Herzog, Tax Shelter Opinions after TEFRA, Circular 230,
and ABA Formal Opinion 346: Who Will Want to Sign Them?, 14 CUMB. L. REv.
493, 504 (1984) [hereinafter Herzog, Opinions after TEFRA].
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Tax Standards Committee article, called for Congress to reduce the tax
288burden as a means of reducing the incentive for tax shelter investments.
The Boston Bar proposed that Congress impose standards on the marketing
of tax shelters,289 perhaps, as some others specifically suggested, requiring
the registration of tax shelters.2 90
But the most interesting-and ultimately most persuasive-calls
were related to penalties. In 1976, Congress imposed a preparer penalty on
negligence and disregard of rules, which generated focus, for example, on
how the penalty was related to Opinion 314's reasonable basis standard2 91
and, more importantly, the level of confidence or disclosure needed to
comply 29 2-- not only to avoid the penalty but also the malpractice claims the
penalty might evidence.293 The bar, however, did not call on Congress to
extend penalties to combat tax shelters through new statutes applicable to tax
professionals but rather to expand penalties to taxpayers-that is, their
clients. The Tax Standards Committee had actually begun calling for such
increased penalties on taxpayers soon after the new penalty standards for
preparers were enacted, arguing that such penalties would increase taxpayer
compliance, which would increase the "proper observance of professional
standards" by tax lawyers.294 After the Circular 230 proposals, this call was
continued by Paul Sax in his Tax Standards Committee article and echoed by
many others, including the Tax Section and the NYSBA Tax Section.295
Laurence Goldfein and Stanley Weiss argued that, if the problem is the use
of opinions as insurance to escape penalties on tax shelter investors, then the
solution is to revise the statutes that impose the penalties.296 The result would
be that clients would police their tax lawyers rather than the other way
around.297 Indeed, Commissioner Kurtz previously suggested this tactic,
288. Sax, Shelter Opinions, supra note 151, at 46; see also Lewis, Treasury
Attacks Tax Shelters, supra note 242; Attorney Defends Profession, supra note 270.
289. Page, Tax Shelter Opinions, supra note 233, at 8.
290. Pames, Tax Shelters, supra note 267.
291. Santi, Legal Liability, supra note 142, at 427-28.
292. Comeel, Committee Report, 1979, supra note 207. The bar was quite
focused on this new standard, and their comments to Treasury sufficed to reduce the
burdens under the final regulations. Frederic G. Comeel, Report of the Committee on
Standards of Tax Practice, 31 TAx LAW. 980 (1978) [hereinafter Comeel, Report of
the Committee, 1978].
293. Santi, Legal Liability, supra note 142, at 423-26.
294. Corneel, Report of the Committee, 1978, supra note 292, at 981; see
also Corneel, Committee Report, 1979, supra note 207, at 532.
295. Sax, Shelter Opinions, supra note 151, at 46; Statement on Proposed
Rule Amending Circular 230, supra note 211, at 747; N.Y. State Bar Ass'n, Circular
230, supra note 211, at 262.
296. Goldfein & Weiss, Proposed Changes, supra note 233, at 345-46.
297. LeDuc, The Legislative Response, supra note 232, at 380-8 1.
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adding that such penalties might even prompt Treasury to withdraw the
proposed changes to Circular 230.298
Ultimately, the calls were effective and Congress enacted new
penalties on taxpayers in 1982,299 which shifted the weight of tax shelter
compliance from Treasury's regulation of lawyers' opinions to the
compliance of their clients. 30 0 This new penalty regime in 1982, along with
Treasury's fundamental acceptance in 1984 of Opinion 346 for setting the
standards for tax shelter opinions, resolved the issues. The Tax Section
"warmly support[ed]" the resulting situation, especially Treasury's
acceptance of the role of the bar in regulating lawyers. 301 However, critics of
the resolution insisted it would drive from tax shelter work the most careful
tax attorneys and, thus, not solve the abuses,302 which some argued could
only be solved by more-demanding professional standards being inserted into
Circular 230 by Treasury or legislated into the Code by Congress.303
IV. BROADER DISCUSSION OF LEGAL ETHICS FOR TAX LAWYERS:
1965-1985
The discussion of ethics for tax lawyers in 1965-1985 was
dominated by debates over Opinion 314's reasonable basis standard and
debates over the standards for tax shelter opinions.304 Both of these debates,
though especially the one on tax shelter opinions, were increasingly technical
and focused on Treasury Department regulations and statutory provisions.305
Given the vigor of the debates, the novelty of the issues, and the questioning
of fundamentals (such as, who should regulate the bar?), it is not surprising
that in 1981 a law school casebook on ethics for tax lawyers was published,
298. These were among his suggestions to the incoming IRS Commissioner
in 1981. Jerome Kurtz, Notes to a New Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 12 TAX
NOTES 1195, 1197 (June 1, 1981).
299. Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248,
96 Stat. 324.
300. Kenneth W. Gideon, Gideon Discusses Substantial Understatement
Penalty, 18 TAx NOTES 560 (Feb. 7, 1983); ABA's Tax Section Comments on
Revised Circular 230, 18 TAX NOTES 810 (Mar. 7, 1983).
301. ABA Section of Tax'n, Statement on Revisions to Proposed Rule
Amending Circular 230 with Respect to Tax Shelter Opinions, 36 TAx LAW. 861
(1983).
302. See, e.g., DeLee, Tax Shelters, supra note 45, at 435; Herzog,
Opinions after TEFRA, supra note 287, at 502.
303. See, e.g., Ann Southworth, Redefining the Attorney's Role in Abusive
Tax Shelters, 37 STAN. L. REv. 889, 905, 916, 918 (1985) [hereinafter Southworth,
Redefining the Attorney's Role].
304. See supra Parts II.B, II.C, III.B.
305. Id.
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Bernard Wolfman and James P. Holden's Ethical Problems in Federal Tax
Practice.306 That tax lawyers would be the first specialists for whom a
specific ethics casebook would be developed underscores how complicated,
technical, and confusing the situation had become by 198 1.307
A. Continuing Influence ofPre-Opinion 314 Literature
Even though the ethics discussion in 1965-1985 became increasingly
complicated, technical, and focused, a broader discussion continued several
of the themes from the pre-1965 period, sometimes tangential to but other
times nested within the debates on the technicalities and specificities of
committee opinions and proposals. Instrumental in this broader discussion
were the articles of the older tax ethics literature that Yale professor Boris
Bittker included in his 1970 anthology, Professional Responsibility in
Federal Tax Practice. In a time before keyword searches and electronic
databases, such an anthology preserved literature and made it accessible in a
way that those now accustomed to database searches may not remember to
appreciate. Appearing after Opinion 314, but including articles that almost
entirely preceded Opinion 314, the anthology ensured the continuation of
discussions broader-and perhaps deeper-than committee opinions, and
also evidenced that Opinion 314 did not address, or at least did not solve,
most of the questions tax lawyers had about their duties. In 1974, the Tax
Standards Committee prepared a bibliography of materials on ethics for tax
lawyers, describing Bittker's collection as "by far the most useful,"308 and in
1977, when it published its "Guidelines to Tax Practice," Bittker's collection
was listed as the first suggested source for beginning research on ethical
problems in tax practice.3 09
The endorsement of the collection would be no surprise, as within it
were articles written by exceptionally impressive tax lawyers. It included two
articles310 written by Randolph E. Paul, who was a founder of Paul, Weiss,
Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison (Paul Weiss), an architect of the modem
income tax, and an advisor to President Franklin D. Roosevelt, as well as
306. Deborah H. Schenk, Tax Ethics, 95 HARV. L. REv. 1995, 1995 (1982)
(reviewing BERNARD WOLFMAN & JAMES HOLDEN, ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN FEDERAL
TAx PRACTICE (1981)).
307. Id.
308. Mansfield, Report of the Committee, 1974, supra note 115, at 582.
309. Guidelines to Tax Practice, supra note 203, at 554.
310. Randolph E. Paul, The Responsibilities of the Tax Adviser, 63 HARV.
L. REV. 377, 378 (1950) [hereinafter Paul, Tax Adviser Responsibilities] (an
adaptation, with minor revisions, of an address before the 1949 Second Annual
Institute on Federal Taxation, University of Southern California School of Law.
Paul, Lawyer As Tax Adviser, supra note 82).
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Henry Ford, Standard Oil Co., and General Motors.' It also included two
articles 312 by Sullivan & Cromwell's Norris Darrell,3t 3 and two companion
articles authored for the 1963 University of Southern California Tax
Planning Institute-one by New York tax lawyer and treatise author Mark H.
Johnson314 and the other by fellow New York lawyer and former NYU law
faculty member Milton Young.315 It included articles by Merle H. Miller, a
former IRS lawyer who founded the ACLU in Indianapolis as well as one of
the city's most prominent law firms; 316 NYU Law professor Jerome
311. Historical Perspective-Profiles in Tax History: Randolph E. Paul,
TAX HIST. PROJECT, Oct. 6, 2004, http://www.taxhistory.org/thp/readings.nsf/
cf7c9c870b600b9585256df80075b9dd/afd2a67073f6b87085256f860068 1 f74?Open
Document. Ever-dedicated to the issues of taxation, Randolph E. Paul died while
testifying before a congressional committee and complaining about President
Eisenhower's tax policies.
312. Darrell, Practitioner's Duty, supra note 77, at 39; Norris Darrell,
Responsibilities of the Lawyer in Tax Practice, in BITTKER, PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 82, at 87.
313. "Mr. Darrell was a partner of Sullivan & Cromwell for 42 years and
president of the American Law Institute for 15 years. He represented the law firm in
Paris and Berlin from 1928 to 1930 and was made a partner in 1934. He was elected
to the Council of the American Law Institute in 1947 and headed a project that laid
the groundwork for the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. He retired in 1976." Norris
Darrell, Lawyer and Tax Expert, 90, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 1989, http://www.ny
times.com/1989/08/15/obituaries/norris-darrell-lawyer-and-tax-expert-90.html. Mr.
Darrell was also the son-in-law of legal legend Learned Hand and executor of his
estate. See Gerald Gunther, "Contracted" Biographies and Other Obstacles to
"Truth, " 70 N.Y.U. L. REv. 697 (1995).
314. Mark H. Johnson, Does the Tax Practitioner Owe a Dual
Responsibility to His Client and the Government?-The Theory, in BITTKER,
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIB[LITY, supra note 82, at 161 [hereinafter Johnson, Dual
Responsibility-The Theory].
315. Milton Young, Does the Tax Practitioner Owe a Dual Responsibility
to His Client and the Government?-The Practice, in BITTKER, PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 82, at 175 [hereinafter Young, Dual Responsibility-
The Practice].
316. Merle H. Miller, Morality in Tax Planning, in BITEKER, PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSBILITY, supra note 82, at 47. Merle H. Miller was with the Office of Chief
Counsel of the Bureau of Internal Revenue prior to joining Ice Miller as a partner in
1940 and beginning the firm's federal tax practice. Crimmins, Ice Miller, supra note
81. He was instrumental in founding the Indianapolis affiliate of the American Civil
Liberties Union (ACLU). Some in the Indianapolis legal community believed that
the ACLU was connected to communism, but Mr. Miller and his firm believed that
the ACLU was good for the law profession and the community they served. Firm
History, ICE MILLER LLP, last accessed Jan. 7, 2014, http://www.icemiller.com/
firm/firm-history/. Mr. Miller and his firm partner Harry Ice were both Eagle Scouts,
and they founded the I and M Firesets Company to manufacture and sell flint and
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Hellerstein; " and Harvard Law School Professor John M. Maguire. 3 18
Professor Bittker's own contribution to his anthology was his 1965 article on
professional responsibility in federal tax practice, which focused, in great
part, on understanding the purpose of the return and how disclosure with
respect to questionable positions was related to the purpose.3t 9
Even though Opinion 314 had set forth the PR Committee's opinion
as the standard for advice on returns and the necessity of disclosure, the
issues continued to generate discussion, often drawing on the pre-Opinion
314 literature in Professor Bittker's anthology. Articles in his anthology were
used to provide historical context, tracing the pre-Opinion 314 debate from
Professor Hellerstein's bemoaning the unethically low standards used to
determine when to disclose,32 0 through Norris Darrel's standard for
disclosure whenever "there is a substantial doubt about the position that is
taken" 3 2 1 and Randolph Paul's standard for disclosure "when the weight of
the law is on the government's side," 32 2 to Mark Johnson's articulation of the
reasonable basis standard prior to Opinion 314.323 Anthology articles were
mined for observations on the distance between public statements and actual
practice,324 the different disclosure standards applicable to different stages of
steel fire starting kits to Boy Scouts. The company was later passed down through
the hands of various scouts and troop leaders in Indianapolis. Firm Fact Sheet for
100 Year Celebration, ICE MILLER LLP, last accessed Jan. 7, 2014,
http://www.icemiller.com/news/l00YearFacts.htm.
317. BITTKER, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 82, at 16.
Professor Hellerstein's comments were captured in a panel discussion.
318. John M. Maguire, Conscience and Propriety in Lawyer's Tax Practice,
in BITTKER, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSBILITY, supra note 82, at 109-30.
319. Boris I. Bittker, Professional Responsibility in Federal Tax Practice,
in BITTKER, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 82, at 233-92.
320. Rowen, Lawyer Advise, supra note 97, at 238 (citing Ethical
Problems, supra note 80, at 8 (statements by Jerome Hellerstein)).
321. Rowen, Lawyer Advise, supra note 97, at 237 (citing Darrell,
Conscience and Propriety, supra note 81, at 10). Mr. Rowen cites what he describes
as an unpublished paper of Mr. Darrell's, though it sets forth a similar position to
what Mr. Darrell maintained in his published writings, which were included in
Bittker's anthology. Norris Darrell, The Tax Practitioner's Duty to his Client and his
Government, in BITEKER, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 82, at 135-39.
322. Rowen, Lawyer Advise, supra note 97, at 237 (citing Paul, Lawyer As
Tax Adviser, supra note 82, at 427-28).
323. Rowen, Lawyer Advise, supra note 97, at 239 (citing Mark H. Johnson
on no need to disclose if reasonable basis).
324. See Sellin, Professional Responsibility, supra note 117, at 586 (citing
Professor John Maguire on likelihood that full disclosure on returns is not as
prevalent in practice as public discussions would suggest); id. at 585-86 (citing
Norris Darrell on "a tendency towards a little larceny when it comes to taxation").
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representation,'3 2  and the general discussion of factors relevant to
determining the appropriate standard. 326 However, the most commonly cited
article related to disclosure standards was Professor Bittker's own. His was
cited for his substantive view that the return was to express the taxpayer's
"honest opinion" of his tax liability (no more, no less), 32 7 but more so for his
caution that "when they demand too much, legal and ethical systems fall of
their own weight," criticizing full disclosure on returns as adding too many
demands and weights on taxpayers.3 28
The earlier ethicists were often cited for describing the various duties
of tax lawyers, such as Professor Hellerstein's argument that tax lawyers
should be "professional[s] . . . not mere hired hands," and ought not "be an
accessory to an escape by taxpayers of their duty to their government."329
325. Corneel, Ethical Guidelines, supra note 115, at 17 n.49 (citing
Randolph Paul for considerations relevant to the duty to make disclosures to the
service once an audit has begun); id. (citing Mark Johnson on analysis of duty to
make disclosures to the service once an audit has begun).
326. Id. at 12 n.34 (citing Professor John M. Maguire for the proposition
that a lawyer's obligation with respect to the correctness of a return does not
override duties of confidentiality); id at 10 n.27 (citing Thomas Tarleau for the
proposition that disclosure may preserve the lawyer's reputation with the IRS); id. at
6 n.17 (citing NYU panel discussion for the proposition that "[e]ven full disclosure
of all relevant facts may not justify a return known to be incorrect"); id. at 6 n.18
(citing NYU panel discussion of developing two types of returns-one in which the
preparer assumes accuracy of facts and one in which he verifies).
327. Id at 7 n.21, 10 n.26 (citing Professor Bittker for idea that the return
expressed "the taxpayers' honest opinion of his legal liability"); see also Johnnie M.
Walters, Ethical and Professional Responsibilities of Tax Practitioners, 17 GONZ. L.
REv. 23, 28 (1981) [hereinafter Walters, Ethical and Professional Responsibilities]
(citing Professor Bittker for "best policy" being "disclosure of every essential fact"
but not "every detail").
328. Sax, Shelter Opinions, supra note 151, at 41-42 (citing Professor
Bittker article in the anthology for the proposition that when "they demand too
much, legal and ethical systems fall of their own weight," and criticizing Treasury's
proposals for being "too ambitious" and exceeding the legal and ethical
requirements). Marc Asbill, in a panel discussion on questionable positions, quoted
Boris Bittker's article in the anthology stating that when "they demand too much,
legal and ethical systems fall of their own weight," and criticizing full disclosure on
returns as adding too many demands and weights on taxpayers. However, IRS
Commissioner Kurtz responded, "I don't agree with you . . . because I don't agree
with Bittker;" Kurtz having just described the success with disclosure the SEC had
and that disclosure in tax matters could follow similarly. Questionable Positions,
supra note 143, at 25-26.
329. Walters, Ethical and Professional Responsibilities, supra note 327, at
30 (alteration in original) (quoting BITrKER, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra
note 82, at 21); see also, e.g., id. at 25 (citing Milton Young for quadruple
responsibilities of tax lawyers: the duty to be proficient, the duty to ensure their
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Randolph Paul described the duty of the lawyer to use "technical attention
and undivided concentration" 330 and be willing to pursue a "statutory
loophole," even if he would "promptly close" it if a legislator.33 ' Both Mr.
Paul and Norris Darrell were invoked in the debate on tax shelter opinions,
with Paul Weiss's James B. Lewis arguing that Randolph Paul and Norris
Darrell would turn down tax shelter work on practical grounds, not wanting
to use their reputations to promote a strategy unlikely to work, as well as it
being inconsistent with their emphasis on lawyers working to improve the
tax system.332 Paul Sax, in his article for the Tax Standards Committee on
Lawyers' Responsibilities in Tax Shelter Opinions, cited Norris Darrell for
the duty to work within the tax system rather than attack it,333 and he cited
Merle Miller for the proposition that tax lawyers' sense of "right and wrong"
used "in their daily lives" might keep them from participating in tax shelter
334promotion.
The most striking use of the articles in Bittker's anthology was in an
article that most resembled earlier literature in its free style and wide-ranging
considerations of tax lawyering, written by Columbia Law School Professor
George Cooper.3 Professor Cooper's article stands out from the technical
comments on formal opinions and proposed regulations, proposing the ideal
tax lawyer as one who integrates his skills and duties in a manner that
benefits the client and the public. The article abandoned the common law-
suggestions are "neither technically unsound nor morally repugnant," the duty to
"help evolve a workable system of taxation," and the duty "above all, to walk
upright"); BITTKER, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 82, at 183-85
(quoting Milton Young).
330. Corneel, Ethical Guidelines, supra note 115, at 3, n.5 (quoting Paul,
Lawyer As Tax Adviser, supra note 82, at 418).
331. Sellin, Professional Responsibility, supra note 117, at 606 (quoting
Paul, Tax Adviser Responsibilities, supra note 310, at 385).
332. Lewis, Ethical Responsibilities, supra note 238, at 797.
333. Sax, Shelter Opinions, supra note 151, at 38.
334. Id. at 43 (quoting Miller, Morality in Tax Planning, supra note 81, at
1077).
335. George Cooper, The Avoidance Dynamic: A Tale of Tax Planning, Tax
Ethics, and Tax Reform, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1553 (1980) [hereinafter Cooper, The
Avoidance Dynamic]. Throughout his article, Professor Cooper cites many of the
articles included in BITrKER, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 82. See
Cooper, The Avoidance Dynamic, supra, at 1577, 1586 (citing Paul, Tax Adviser
Responsibilities, supra note 3 10); id. at 1583 (citing Paul, Lawyer As Tax Adviser,
supra note 82); id. at 1584, 1588 (citing Darrell, Practitioner's Duty, supra note 77);
id. at 1586-88 (citing Thomas J. Graves, Responsibility of the Tax Adviser); id. at
1587 (citing Johnson, Dual Responsibility-The Theory, supra note 314); id. at
1577, 1588 (citing Young, Dual Responsibility-The Practice, supra note 315).
Professor Cooper also quotes Bittker and Darrell, id. at 1587-88, but provides
citations to BITTKER, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 82.
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review-article form, instead taking the form of a narrative between a senior
lawyer advocating for the ideal and then, by turns, a less experienced and
more aggressive tax lawyer (whose plan is under question), and then the Tax
Standards committee (to whom the senior lawyer complains of the younger
one's plan), and then to Congress (to whom he turns to reform the problems
exploited by the younger lawyer's plan).3 Professor Cooper lectures the
younger lawyer on tax ethics, which he describes as more "basic and
transcendent" than substantive tax.m He said that there is "some mix" in the
tax lawyer's duty of "avoidance-seeking" with "allegiance to the fisc and to
higher principle," which means some things are "wrong, even if they work"
and arriving at the right point requires one to "agonize" in the "quest to sort
out right from wrong." 3 3 8 He contrasted this with the younger lawyer's
"modem" approach, one of "cost-benefit analysis," which exploits the audit
lottery in carrying an argument "as far as we can, so long as the downside
risk is not too bad."3 39 Professor Cooper divided the tax lawyer's advising
role into (1) advising on a "non-tax-motivated transaction that the client has
already determined to pursue" and (2) advising on "how to save taxes as an
end itself, without any particular transactional objectives in mind."3 4 0 The
client's nontax objectives meaningfully constrain the lawyer in the first, but
in the second, there is "only the lawyer's wisdom and self-restraint."3 41
Without wisdom and self-restraint, the tax lawyer would resort to a "smart
aleck's tax gimmick[s]."3 42 These gimmicks shared several marks: "creating
an unintended [tax] benefit out of quirks" of the law, pursing tax benefits that
have "unlimited" scope (being the product of quirks), using knowledge
known only to "tax avoidance cognoscenti," and relying on a "low profile"
on the tax return. In contrast to these smart aleck gimmicks, acceptable tax
planning availed the client of tax benefits intended by Congress, even if not
"intended for us;" meaning tax benefits that have some limit to them, being
intended (at least for someone) by Congress; benefits that are known to
336. The article begins with the young lawyer's tax plan. Cooper, The
Avoidance Dynamic, supra note 335, at 1554-77. The younger and senior partner
exchange memorandums, with the younger partner defending his plan legally and
ethically while the senior partner criticizes it. Id at 1577-92. The client decides to
use the plan of the younger partner, and the senior partner reports the plan to the
Subcommittee on Practice Standards of the bar association Section on Taxation. Id
at 1592-93. Eventually the senior partner takes his concerns to Congress to address
the problems raised by this plan. Id. at 1596-622.
337. Id. at 1577.
338. Id at 1578.
339. Id.
340. Id. at 1581.
341. Id at 1582.
342. Id. at 1586.
343. Id.
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Congress and the IRS as well as "any orthodontist or orthopedist" and that
will be disclosed acceptably on the return.344 The responsible tax lawyer,
Professor Cooper argued, was to give advice that respected the basic
structure of the tax law, thereby overcoming the "great temptation to tout
clever dodges[] because it makes us look smart," 34 5 and better "serv[ing] the
law, ourselves, and even our clients."34 6
B. Guidelines of Tax Lawyers
In pre-1965 articles included in Professor Bittker's anthology, both
Merle Miller and Professor John Maguire suggested the usefulness of written
office conduct codes for tax lawyers,347 which Frederic Corneel in 1972,348
and then the Tax Standards Committee in 1978, produced. 3 49 The two were
substantially the same, as Mr. Comeel was the Chairman of the committee
when its guidelines were drafted and was one of the two principal draftsmen
of the committee versions. 350 The guidelines were not drafted to change the
standards of the tax bar so much as to educate less-experienced tax lawyers
as to the norms of more-experienced tax lawyers,'s5 specifically as to the fact
that not everybody does "it"-that is, "sham and corner cutting."352 Mr.
Corneel's version presented the guidelines at the conclusion of an article in
which he discussed the results of a polling of "approximately 100 Boston tax
practitioners" as to "a variety of ethical problems" that commonly occurred
in tax practice.3 53 He did not set out to resolve those ethical problems by
applying ethical standards; rather, he set out to report how those problems
are, in fact, resolved by those he considered sufficiently experienced to teach
344. Id.
345. Id. at 1588.
346. Id.
347. Corneel, Ethical Guidelines, supra note 115, at 35.
348. Id. at 1.
349. Guidelines to Tax Practice, supra note 203.
350. Id. Mr. Comeel also drafted a model set of guidelines for use by the
nonlawyer employees in the office. Frederic G. Comeel, The Code and the Law
Firm, 63 A.B.A. J. 570 (1977).
351. In his version, Mr. Corneel wrote that it was intended to be "a primer
for young attorneys entering upon tax practice." Comeel, Ethical Guidelines, supra
note 115, at 1. Whereas the committee version as described as intended for tax
practitioners who are not themselves experienced. Guidelines to Tax Practice, supra
note 203, at 551.
352. Guidelines to Tax Practice, supra note 203, at 551.
353. Comeel, Ethical Guidelines, supra note 115, at 5.
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the newer generation of practitioners.) The guidelines addressed audits
(focusing on avoiding misrepresentation)55 and return preparation (due
diligence and reasonable basis). 35 6 As to tax planning, the advice would be
against any plan "bound to fail if all of the facts become known to the
Service," usually excluding transactions "entirely lacking in economic
substance and intended solely to conceal or mislead," and usually against
"borderline plans since borders in taxation frequently shift."357 As to tax
shelters, the guideline was to assist only when "there is a substantial
likelihood that the tax consequences will be resolved in favor of the
taxpayer" and to always remember that giving an opinion "may be taken ...
as our endorsement" of the shelter.
C. Duties of Tax Lawyers
The guidelines addressed tax lawyering at a practical level, but the
discussion of roles and duties at a more abstract level continued from the pre-
1965 literature. As Frederic Corneel put it-revealing the imprint of his own
time-are tax lawyers doing anything other than helping their clients "in
their unchristian endeavor to shift their tax burden to their neighbors?"359 If
so, he wondered, how "can the tax lawyer return at night to his innocent
children without 'cheeks incarnadined by a blush of shame?"' 36 0 Mostly,
there was agreement that the tax lawyer had duties beyond those to the client,
such as those to the tax system, the profession, or himself.3 6 ' The discussion
354. The use of professional custom as setting ethical standards was an
approach also used by Henry Sellin. Sellin, Professional Responsibility, supra note
117, at 589.
355. Guidelines to Tax Practice, supra note 203, at 552-53. Discovery of
"clear and substantial mistake[s]" on prior returns was to be followed by informing
the client of the mistake and the absence of a requirement of filing an amended
return-accompanied with the advice that "a tax that is owing is a debt" and that an
amended return should nevertheless be filed and the tax paid. Id. at 553.
356. The guidelines required a reasonable basis for return preparation
(including the prudence of documenting the reasonable basis to avoid penalty), a
rejection of exploiting the audit lottery, the duty to make "further inquiry" when the
there is an indication "that the material supplied to us may be incorrect or
incomplete," and the potential for the need to withdraw if a client disregards advice
as to the return. Id.
357. Id. at 554.
358. Id.
359. Corneel, Ethical Guidelines, supra note 115, at 2.
360. Id.
361. See, e.g., Sellin, Professional Responsibility, supra note 117, at 585
(citing WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 1, sc. 3); Sax, Shelter Opinions, supra
note 151, at 30; Walters, Ethical and Professional Responsibilities, supra note 327,
at 25-26; Garbis, Tax Professional, supra note 159, at 23-24.
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of these duties was premised on some points of general agreement: the
protection of the tax system,362 the condemnation of exploiting the audit
363 thlottery, and the variability of duties with roles (e.g., return preparer, audit
representative).3 6 Some of those roles were generally regarded as clearly
adversarial, but the degree to which other roles were adversarial-or, indeed,
the appropriateness of an adversarial attitude towards IRS lawyers-was
commonly discussed.6 On the point of attitude, Henry Sellin argued that the
government should never be considered an adversary, saying that a tax
dispute is never "a taxpayer against the government," but rather is always
"one taxpayer against all the other taxpayers," as the one who pays "less than
his fair share" shifts the costs of our government to the rest of us. 3 66 He also
thought IRS agents should be given astronaut-like respect for their role in the
tax system.367
Frederic Corneel answered his own question (about "unchristian"
burden-shifting) by saying that a world without tax lawyers would be unjust,
as only the IRS would know about tax laws, 3 68 and that tax lawyers served
both clients and the system by providing assurance-both that the taxes that
should be paid are and, just as importantly, that the taxes that should not be
paid are not.3 69 He added that, while "this does not mean that in terms of
Judeo-Christian ethics the work of a tax lawyer ranks with the nursing in a
leper colony," it is a socially necessary work that ought to be done well. 370
But Mr. Corneel joined with others to argue that in addition to the good this
work does for the client, the tax lawyer also ought to devote significant time
to reforming-primarily simplifying-the tax law.3 7 1 Others, such as David
362. See, e.g., Sax, Shelter Opinions, supra note 151, at 38.
363. See, e.g., Roberts et al., Complexity, supra note 254, at 330; Nolan,
Audit Coverage, supra note 138, at 426; Sellin, Professional Responsibility, supra
note I17, at 597; Sax, Shelter Opinions, supra note 151, at 36.
364. See, e.g., Walters, Ethical and Professional Responsibilities, supra
note 327, at 28-29 (as return preparer), 29-32 (during audit), 33-34 (as litigator),
34-37 (as planner); Patterson, Tax Shelters, supra note 161, at 1171.
365. See, e.g., Corneel, Ethical Guidelines, supra note 115, at 16; Sellin,
Professional Responsibility, supra note 117, at 606; Questionable Positions, supra
note 143, at 21, 26; Proposed Regulations Threaten Adversary System, supra note
267; Southworth, Redefining the Attorney's Role, supra note 303, at 910; Sax et al.,
Report of the Special Task Force, supra note 170, at 458.
366. Sellin, Professional Responsibility, supra note 117, at 608 (emphasis
omitted).
367. Id. at 587.
368. Corneel, Tax Planning Teaching, supra note 112, at 222.
369. Corneel, Ethical Guidelines, supra note 115, at 2.
370. Id. at 3.
371. Id. at 36; Roberts et al., Complexity, supra note 254, at 327-31, 367-
73. IRS Commissioner Jerome Kurtz wanted more lawyers who really understood
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E. Watts, Vice-Chair of the Tax Standards Committee, emphasized that the
lawyer's devotion to the client's knowledge and, just as importantly, the
client's awareness of the lawyer's devotion, serves not only the client, but
the system itself by building taxpayer confidence in the system, rightly
informing tax reporting and easing the administrative burdens of the IRS. 372
Former government lawyer-turned-private practitioner Johnnie M. Walters
thought the lawyer's duties to the client and the tax system (which supports
both "our democratic system of government and private enterprise")7 3 were
fulfilled by the same result the Government should be seeking: the correct
result "under the circumstances, and facts, and the applicable law." 374 A
NYSBA Tax Section committee contended that the good tax lawyers did for
both clients and the public was in providing conservative tax advice, which
helped to turn "their backs and their clients' backs" on questionable
schemes. 375 This restraining effect of conservative tax advice protected both
the client and the system. 7 Not all explanations of a tax lawyer's duties
were so conventional, however. A much more radical position was taken by
Harvard Law Professor Ray Patterson, who declared the bar's ethical
interpretations to be self-serving.3 77 He argued that the lawyers' duties were
derived from the client's legal obligations rather than the bar's ethics rules
and that the taxpayer's legal duty of candor meant the lawyer had to reveal
the weaknesses of the client's position to the IRS.378
D. Separate Rules for Tax Lawyers
The discussion of special duties for tax lawyers prompted an obvious
question: whether or not tax lawyers should have a code of professional
conduct that differed in some ways from the one generally applicable to
lawyers. The 1965-1985 period was an especially good time for the question,
given that during this period the code of conduct for lawyers underwent
significant changes, with the tax bar invited to participate.379
the technical issues of the tax system to provide their private views on proposed
regulations. See Byrne, Reform Agenda, supra note 192, at 4.
372. David E. Watts, Professional Standards in Tax Practice: Conflicts of
Interest, Disclosure Problems under Regulatory Agency Rules, Potential Liabilities,
33 N.Y.U. ANN. INST. ON FED. TAX'N 649, 650-51 (1975) [hereinafter Watts,
Conflicts of Interest].
373. Walters, Ethical and Professional Responsibilities, supra note 327, at
25.
374. Id. at 26.
375. Roberts et al., Complexity, supra note 254, at 369.
376. Id. at 331, 369-70.
377. Patterson, Tax Shelters, supra note 161, at 1176.
378. Id.
379. See supra Part I.
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The Tax Standards Committee had been appointed in 1962, and in its
first report had identified the possibility that there may be "new
responsibilities voluntarily to be assumed by lawyers in the tax practice, and
if so, this could be made the subject of a new Canon of Ethics."so
Determining whether or not tax lawyers ought to have a different
professional code became an ongoing project for the committee.3 ' The
opportunity to establish a special code for tax lawyers became significant in
1964 when the ABA created a Special Committee on Evaluation of Ethical
Standards-the "Wright Committee"-to draft rules intended to replace the
Canons, which had been in effect since 1908.382 When the Wright Committee
began its work, the Chairman of the Tax Standards Committee "inquired of
the Tax Section Committee whether the revision of the Canons of Ethics
should provide special rules for tax lawyers. Such survey found the
Committee overwhelmingly opposed to such an approach."3 83 Curiously, this
survey is not mentioned in the reports of the Tax Standards Committee but is
mentioned in a footnote in an article later written by the then-Chair Marvin
K. Collie.384
It may be that a change in the chair and membership of the Tax
Standards Committee changed its course, narrowing its focus to commenting
on the applications of the Canons. When Mr. Collie signed the 1969 Report
of the Tax Standards Committee, he opened it with a history of the
committee, writing that it had been created "primarily as an ombudsman for
the Tax Section with respect to" the Wright Committee's work in drafting a
new Code. 385 He added that there "was very little for the Section Committee
380. Miller, Report of the Special Committee, July 1963, supra note 76, at
270.
381. Special Committee on Standards of Tax Practice, BULL. SEC. TAX'N ,
Jan. 1964, at 35; Miller, Report of the Special Committee, Jan. 1964, supra note 76,
at 37; Miller & Grosvenor, Jr., Report of the Special Committee, July 1964, supra
note 89, at 272.
382. Although there had been discussion of reforming the professional
standards, the proximate reasons for the creation of the committee "remain elusive."
Ariens, American Legal Ethics, supra note 63, at 433-34. About this time, Wall
Street lawyers were questioning the sufficiency of the Canons, and amendments to
the Code of Trial Conduct of the American College of Trial Lawyers were being
considered. Id. For the history of the committee's work and a context for it, see id.
383. Collie & Marinis, Ethical Considerations, supra note 113, at 460 n.16.
384. Id.
385. Marvin K. Collie, Report of the Special Committee on Standards of
Tax Practice, 22 TAx LAw. 759, 759 (1969) [hereinafter Collie, Report of the
Special Committee, 1969]. To the extent the committee then took its primary purpose
to be commenting on the new Code, its input as a committee was minimal. In
January 1969 (only months before the new Code was adopted), the STP Committee
was provided a preliminary draft of the new Code for its members' comments. Id. at
761. A confidential preliminary draft of the new Code of Professional Responsibility
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to do" until the Wright Committee issued a report.m But in fact, contrary to
the chair's history, the Tax Standards Committee had been created in 1962,
while the Wright Committee was not created until 1964, and the Tax
Standards Committee's first report was a lengthy overview of ethical
principles related to tax practice, specific issues for the Committee to
consider, and a reproduction of a very pro-tax-system statement of conduct
for corporate tax executives.38 ' Nevertheless, with Chairman Collie's polling,
was released to the committee members for personal comment in October 1968,
though there is no record of their comments. In response to the January 1969
preliminary draft were only three comments directly related to taxation. One
comment was as to a footnote summarizing case law, to the effect that criminal
violations of the tax law did not involve "moral turpitude" for disciplinary purposes.
The committee believed "the Code should disagree with such implication at least if
the violation is a felony." A second comment was a technical comment on the
limitations of holding oneself out as a specialist. Id. The issue of specialization came
under considerable discussion during this period. The members of the committee
were generally unenthusiastic, ambivalent, or opposed to specialization but believed
it inevitable. Id. at 760. They also doubted that tax lawyers should be considered
"specialists," even if nontax lawyers thought tax lawyers were. Id. at 762; see also
Committee Activities, BULL. SEC. TAx'N, Jan. 1965, at 5, 17; Kostelanetz, Report of
the Special Committee, July 1966, supra note 111. The broadest comment was that
the new Code provided "no real answer . . . to the 'dual responsibility' question" nor
to the question of when "in the administrative process the governmental
representative ceases to be an advocate and becomes a 'tribunal."' Collie, Report of
the Special Committee, 1969, supra, at 761. When the new Model Code of
Professional Responsibility became effective on January 1, 1970, its failure to
address the dual responsibilities of tax lawyers and when the government was to be
considered an adversary were not addressed.
386. Collie, Report of the Special Committee, 1969, supra note 385, at 759.
387. Miller, Report of the Special Committee, July 1963, supra note 76, at
267-75. When the Tax Standards Committee was created, it was charged with
raising the ethical level of practice among tax lawyers. Chairman's Page, Apr. 1962,
supra note 75, at 3. The committee located its concerns as "part of the study of
morality and ethics in business, now preoccupying many people." Miller, Report of
the Special Committee, July 1963, supra note 76, at 268. The committee reproduced
in its annual report standards of conduct for the tax executive adopted by the Tax
Executives Institute, including "(1) He accepts taxes as the cost of civilization and he
accepts the laws imposing taxes as the mechanisms for distributing that cost among
businesses and individuals; (2) [1]f a tax law or a combination of tax laws appears
open to an interpretation that would give ... an advantage which was not considered
in the enactment of such law or laws, he will have due regard for the interests of
society in sound tax policy; (3) [W]ith respect to efforts to have the tax laws
changed, . . . he will place the interests of society in sound tax policy before both his
and his company's interests and the interests of his company before his own
interests; (4) He accepts each government representative with whom he deals as a
person devoted to fulfilling the obligation to collect revenue honorably in accordance
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the consideration of a special code for tax lawyers was set aside, and though
occasionally mentioned by writers over the years, never pursued by the tax
bar.388
E. Liabilities for Tax Lawyers
As part of the debate over tax shelter opinion standards, the new
penalty standard on taxpayers enacted in 1982 requiring substantial authority
and a reasonable belief that the tax treatment was more likely than not
proper389 rendered negative opinions of little to no value and thereby
rendered moot a significant debate over the regulation of opinion-writers.3 90
Even putting aside the 1982 penalty, during this 1965-1985 period there was
significant consideration of the role of penalties. In 1974 Shearman &
Sterling's James Rowen proposed a new taxpayer penalty for underpayments
attributable to certain types of undisclosed positions (e.g., contrary to rulings
or involving transactions with related parties),3 9 1 and within a few years
thereafter, the Tax Standards Committee began studying the usefulness of
increasing penalties on taxpayers.3 92 Of course, following the 1976
legislation that created penalties for tax return preparers who understate
taxpayer liability through unreasonable positions or willful or reckless
conduct, tax lawyers had to consider more carefully their own exposure to
penalties, not just their clients'.3 93 There was also increasing concern as to
criminal charges being brought against tax lawyers for inappropriate advising
or opinion writing.394 As one tax lawyer summarized near the end of the
period, the "tax professional is far more vulnerable to the I.R.S. and
taxpayers than previously. There can no longer be aggressive planning and
reporting without concern for penalty exposure for the taxpayer and/or the
professional."
However, it was not only tax-related penalties that were of
increasing concern. The use of tax opinions in the securities sales literature
with law; (5) He will present without concealment the facts required in tax returns
and the facts pertinent to the resolution of questions at issue with representatives of
the government imposing the tax." Id. at 268-69.
388. See, e.g., Comeel, Ethical Guidelines, supra note 115, at 35.
389. I.R.C. § 6621(b)(2)(B) (1982); see also DeLee, Tax Shelters, supra
note 45, at 448.
390. See supra Part III.A.
391. Rowen, Lawyer Advise, supra note 97, at 237, 262-63.
392. Corneel, Committee Report, 1979, supra note 207, at 532.
393. I.R.C. § 6694 (1976).
394. See, e.g., David F. Pike, New Salvos in the Tax Shelter War; IRS,
Justice Step Up Attack, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 12, 1985, at 12; Santi, Legal Liability,
supra note 142, at 418-19, 427-28.
395. Garbis, Tax Professional, supra note 159, at 23.
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and the duties to the investors exposed lawyers to potential liability not only
from potential investors but also from the SEC. 9 At least one tax lawyer
worried about the "inter-agency coordination" of the IRS and SEC397 as well
as the relevance of state authorities premised on state securities or consumer
protection laws.398 David Watts, Vice-Chair of the Tax Standards
Committee, considered the "principal risks of incurrence of liability in
connection with rendering tax opinions" to "arise under the Federal securities
laws,"3 99 with claims that could be "staggering." 4 00 Although securities-
related liabilities were mentioned repeatedly, there was growing concern
over professional liabilities in all its forms. Articles were written specifically
on the malpractice liabilities of tax lawyers, 40 ' and one concluded that not
only must the lawyer "protect the client, third parties and the I.R.S.-but he
must also protect himself."402 The concern that the tax lawyer's "focus must
be on protection at every stage" 403 prompted Marvin Garbis to offer his "law
of survival" on these issues: "If you can't completely solve a tax compliance
problem, at least make it someone else's." 40 4 Clearly, whatever the
theoretical duties of a tax lawyer, or whatever the standards in Circular 230
or an ABA opinion, the risk of civil liabilities and malpractice suits were
demanding increased attention.
V. REFLECTIONS ON LEGAL ETHICS FOR TAX LAWYERS, 1945-1985
The 1965-1985 literature is quite unlike its 1945-1965 counterpart in
several ways. The pre-1965 literature is dominated by contributions from
individuals writing as individuals. 405 Their writings are more individualistic,
more personal--conveying their personal tastes, revealing their professional
pressures, and articulating personal perspectives.40 6 None of the writers were
focused on professional ethics canons or potential liabilities, making only
396. See, e.g., Nolan, Audit Coverage, supra note 138, at 429; Weber et al.,
Tax Advisors, supra note 92, at 613; Sax, Shelter Opinions, supra note 151, at 16;
Burrell, Legal Malpractice, supra note 239, at 270-71; Gimenez, Securities and Tax
Liabilities, supra note 232, at 25-28, 42-43, 46.
397. Gimenez, Securities and Tax Liabilities, supra note 232, at 28.
398. Id. at 36-38.
399. Watts, Conflicts of Interest, supra note 372; see also, e.g., Burrell,
Legal Malpractice, supra note 239, at 270-71.
400. Watts, Conflicts ofInterest, supra note 372, at 659.
401. See, e.g., Santi, Legal Liability, supra note 142, at 404-11; Burrell,
Legal Malpractice, supra note 239, at 270-71.
402. Burrell, Legal Malpractice, supra note 239, at 275.
403. Id.
404. Garbis, Tax Professional, supra note 159, at 24.
405. See, e.g., Hatfield, Legal Ethics, supra note 4, at 5-6, 9, 32.
406. See, e.g., id. at 46-55.
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incidental references to either.40 7 They referenced the state of the world and
the needs of their government and focused on their civic duties, relating their
professional roles within the tax system to those civic duties.4 08 Given their
government's need for revenue and the voluntary assessment system feeding
the revenue, they pondered the specialness of their roles as tax lawyers.40 9
They debated whether there were special duties of tax lawyers to the system,
at least when advising clients on minimizing their liabilities or assessing their
liabilities. 41 0 How to improve the tax-related morals of both lawyers and
clients was a common concern, as was the idea that tax lawyers had a special
duty to educate their clients with respect to their duties to the tax system.4 11
Whatever their opinions on abstract issues of principle, there was a near
consensus on practical issues in which good ethics and good business and
good tax advice conveniently coalesced.4 12 The 1945-1965 writers were
patriotic pragmatists, comfortably convinced that good advice served their
government's interests, their client's interests, and their own interests
without any diminution through conflict.
In contrast, the 1965-1985 literature is largely the literature of
committees rather than individuals: beginning with the 1962 appointment of
the Tax Standards Committee and the 1965 Opinion of the PR Committee
and continuing through the work of both of those committees on revising the
1965 Opinion, as well as the work of the Tax Section, the NYSBA Tax
Section, the Boston Tax Committee, and the City Bar Association. 4 13 The
work of the committees was mostly in reaction to external prodding, such as
the Tax Section's charge to the Tax Standards Committee, the PR
Committee's response to requests, and all the committees' response to the
Treasury Department's proposal to regulate tax lawyers directly.4 14 Gone
were the free-flowing and wide-ranging ruminations of the individual
lawyers writing in 1945-1965, and in their place were the specific issues,
narrowed scope, and narrowed language of committee reports. 415 The
specificity, scope, and language of the committee reports then determined the
manner in which even the committees' critics considered the issues, resulting
in the discussions becoming more tightly focused and technical.4 16 New
terms of art unknown to prior generations of tax lawyers-"reasonable
407. See, e.g., id. at 11, 23, 43.
408. See, e.g., id at 46-55.
409. See, e.g., id. at 16-28.
410. See, e.g., id at 16-28.
411. See, e.g., id at 10-11, 19, 22, 49-50.
412. See, e.g., id at 23-28, 32-44.
413. See, e.g., supra Parts I, II.B, II.C, III.B.
414. See, e.g., supra Parts I, II.B, II.C, III.B.
415. Compare Hatfield, Legal Ethics, supra note 4, at 12, 19, 27, with supra
Parts II.A, II.C, II.D, III.A.
416. See, e.g., supra Parts II.B, II.C, II.D, III.B.
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basis," "substantial support," "substantial likelihood," "substantial basis,"
"substantial authority," and "realistic possibility of success"-became both
the centers and constraints of the debates.417 While the committee reports
were less philosophical, provocative, and, perhaps, profound than the earlier
writers' more personal works, the committee processes of negotiation and
compromise not only made the discussion more focused and technical but
more informed and nuanced-and presumably more acceptable to a greater
number of tax lawyers.
While negotiation and compromise may have reduced
contentiousness within the committees, there was remarkable contention
between the tax expert committees and ethics experts committees. In 1965,
the PR Committee rejected the Tax Standards Committee's request for
guidance on specific problems and gave instead general principles that were
not informed by the considerable prior analysis and discussion of the ethical
principles of tax lawyering.418 And then in 1985, the PR Committee again
rejected the Tax Standards Committee's characterization of returns as
nonadversarial, its emphasis on the variability of duties due to the lawyers'
role, and its claim that the standard for tax planning advice should be no
lower than the return position standard.4 19 However, unlike in 1965, the Tax
Standards Committee responded by issuing its own interpretation of the PR
Committee's 1985 Opinion, restating parts of its initial proposal, and,
perhaps more importantly, asserting its own weight by doing so. 42 0
Why such a disagreement between the tax expert committees and the
ethics expert committees? It was not that tax lawyers were arguing for
special ethics rules as such an idea had been shelved for almost two decades
before the 1985 Opinion duel.4 2 1 The 1965 and 1985 Opinions of the ethics
experts emphasized the adversarial role of lawyers, and perhaps their concern
was that no Opinion be taken as precedent to diminish adversarial rights
against the government.42 2 However, the tax lawyers emphasized the advisor
role, and also the use of tax advice to protect against penalties and its
potential to exploit the audit lottery, which was not a potential with an analog
in the adversarial system.4 23 The Tax Standards Committee and others who
had criticized the reasonable basis standard were concerned to hold the line
against overly aggressive advisors who threatened to replace more-
417. See supra Parts II.A, II.B, II.C.
418. See supra Part H.A.
419. See supra Part H.C.
420. Compare supra Part II.A, with supra Part II.D.
421. See supra Part IV.D. Query how the development of tax lawyer
regulation would have differed had different ethics rules been adopted in the 1960s.
Would the need for Circular 230's expansion have arisen?
422. See supra Parts II.A, II.C.
423. See supra Parts II.B, III.B.
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conservative advisors.4 24 There is no reason to suspect this was an issue of
financial interests at stake in competition with aggressive advisors, as such
an economic competition could be met by becoming more aggressive in
advice, as the PR Committee standards arguably allowed. These tax lawyers
expressed concern as to the potential damage to the tax system: revenue loss,
administrative burden, and increased complexity. 425 But perhaps there was
also defense of a professional model in which satisfaction was found in
respecting civic concerns while exercising broad judgment in pursuing a
client's actual business objectives-rather than pursuing "a smart aleck's tax
gimmicks," as Professor Cooper put it.4 2 6
Unlike the considerations of legal ethics for tax lawyers before 1965,
the PR Committee's 1965 Opinion began and ended with considering the
Canons.4 27 This began a new approach, not just in appeal to objective
standards, such as the Canons and then the Model Rules in the 1985 Opinion,
but also in a focus on technicalities.4 28 It was even suggested that the
technical changes between the Canons and PR Code had actually changed
how tax lawyers were to understand their duties.42 9 This shift towards a
legalistic approach to professional standards may partially reflect the greater
shift in the bar from legal ethics towards a law of lawyering, to the extent
there was buy-in to the suggestion that the technical changes were
substantively relevant for tax lawyers.4 3 0 The focus on ethical technicalities
was soon met with the focus on legal technicalities, as new penalties on
taxpayers and their advisors further changed the approach to legal ethics
from what had occurred prior to 1965.43' The result was an analysis more
about avoiding violations than fulfilling aspirations.432 It also transformed
some considerable legal ethics issues for tax lawyers into the compliance
issues of their clients.433 The writers began considering what penalties for
noncompliance should be, some arguing that this would be a more effective
solution for the Treasury's problems than issuing professional standards for
tax lawyers.434 Others, echoing Boris Bittker and Virginia professor John
Potts Barnes in the earlier literature, argued that clarification of the lawyer's
424. See supra Part III.B.
425. See supra Part III.B. In the earlier literature, Sullivan & Cromwell's
Norris Darrell had recognized the risk that more-conservative tax advisers might lose
clients to more-aggressive ones. Hatfield, Legal Ethics, supra note 4, at 37.
426. See supra Part IV.A.
427. See supra Part II.A.
428. See supra Parts II.A, II.B, II.C.
429. See supra Part II.B.
430. See Ariens, American Legal Ethics, supra note 63, at 444-53.
431. See supra Parts II.B, II.C, III.B.
432. See supra Parts II.B, IV.E.
433. Id.
434. See supra Parts II.B, II.C, III.B.
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duties could be reached only by beginning with the client's. 4 3 5 Yet, what was
new was asking Congress to impose statutory penalties on clients as a means
of reducing client pressure on lawyers to evade their professional duties.436 In
with calls for these penalties were also calls for more direct government
regulation of tax lawyers, be it through Congress or the Treasury or the
rejection of the bar as regulator.43 7 While an earlier generation of tax lawyers
had sought additional guidance for lawyers advising their clients, some in
this generation were seeking additional regulation of both lawyers and their
clients.438
This growing awareness and even acceptance of increasing penalties
and regulation may also reflect the growing awareness tax lawyers had of
their exposure to liabilities from various directions. The earlier generation of
writers did not focus on the potential liabilities imposed on the lawyer,
though there were passing references to malpractice concerns and securities
laws.4 39 But in 1965-1985, the potential liabilities considered by the tax
lawyers were not just related to the new tax standards, but also to criminal
laws and securities suits by both investors and the SEC. 440 There was also
considerable attention devoted to the potential malpractice liabilities.44'
The openness of some tax lawyers to more direct governmental
regulation was in stark contrast to the government skepticism of others.
Given the economic malaise of the 1970s and the conservative realignment
of the 1980s, Mark Giminez's writing that "when the government becomes
bored with regulating airplanes, trucks and railroads, and begins regulating
lawyers," the legal system will become bankrupt too, presumably hit a
resonant chord among some lawyers of the day.442 Many of whom, including
the NYSBA Tax Section, described the Treasury's proposed amendments to
Circular 230 as striking at fundamental American rights to adversarial
challenges to their government.4 43 More subtly, but perhaps more revealing
of the degree to which government skepticism had grown, were those who
proposed that the solution for the abusive tax-shelter problem was neither
increased penalties on taxpayers or advisors, but rather lowered tax
435. Compare Hatfield, Legal Ethics, supra note 4, at 30, with supra Parts
II.B, IV.C.
436. See supra Part III.B.
437. See supra Parts 11.B, III.B.
438. Compare Hatfield, Legal Ethics, supra note 4, at 55, with supra Parts
II.B3, III.B.
439. The reference to securities laws was speculation as to their influence
on those advocating a high degree of disclosure on returns. See Hatfield, Legal
Ethics, supra note 4, at 32, 42.
440. See supra Parts I, II.A, II.B, IV.E.
44 1. Id.
442. Gimenez, Securities and Tax Liabilities, supra note 232, at 45.
443. See supra Part III.B.
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burdens-as if the high rates justified a high rate of evasion.4 In the 1945-
1965 period, there was caution against "police state" and "Big Brother"
mentalities in tax administration, but this caution was during a time of broad
bipartisan support for the tax system with its extraordinarily high marginal
rates and the government revenue needs it satisfied, especially as these
related to winning the Cold War." 5 But, of course, by 1985 (post-Vietnam,
post-Watergate, and post-reelection of Ronald Reagan) the attitude towards
the federal government had changed considerably, and it is not surprising
that this might affect how some lawyers understood their relationship to the
government and their clients' money. At least one writer, however, resisted
this skepticism-Henry Sellin thought IRS agents should be given astronaut-
like respect and that the government should never be considered an
adversary. 446 However, his attitude is the exception that proves the rule as to
the change in tone, given how out of place it sounds in 1965-1985-and how
commonly sounded it was in 1945-1965.447
Whatever the degree of skepticism of government programs and
regulations, legal ethics for tax lawyers were not entirely reduced to avoiding
penalties and liabilities during this period. The claim that tax lawyers had
special duties continued, mostly on the same grounds claimed in 1945-1965,
especially the self-assessment nature of the tax system and the
nonadversarial role of the tax lawyer as advisor." 8 Unlike the earlier
literature, the 1965-1985 literature's duty references were not usually tied to
patriotism."4 Like the earlier literature, the 1965-1985 writers did not
advance a specific "special" duty but rather used the concept more as a
catch-all for the complex considerations that tax lawyers had in a self-
assessing tax system. In large part, perhaps this is best understood as an
attempt to articulate the ways in which the tax lawyer provided value to both
the client and the system. As Frederic Corneel asked, are tax lawyers doing
anything other than helping their clients "in their unchristian endeavor to
shift their tax burden to their neighbors"o 50 In terms of advice, the
suggestions included that the tax lawyers benefitted the system by easing the
burden on the administrative system with sound advice, availing their clients
of intended benefits, and protecting the basic structure of the tax law.45 1 The
444. Id.
445. See Hatfield, Legal Ethics, supra note 4, at 2-3, 12-15.
446. See supra Part IV.C.
447. Compare Hatfield, Legal Ethics, supra note 4, at 12-14, with supra
Part IV.C.
448. Compare Hatfield, Legal Ethics, supra note 4, at 17-18, 20-21, with
supra Parts IV.C, IV.D.
449. Hatfield, Legal Ethics, supra note 4, at 11-14, 19-20.
450. Corneel, Ethical Guidelines, supra note 115, at 2; see also supra Part
IV.C.
451. See supra Parts IV.A, IV.C.
2014] 733
Florida Tax Review
loudest echo of reasoning with the earlier writers was the sentiment that the
tax system was served by conservative advice, or as Merle Miller had put it
in 1952: "The man who can kill off a bad tax scheme at its inception is
contributing greatly to the well being of the country at large."452
Indeed, whatever the differences between the writers in the two
periods, both sets may largely be understood as trying to articulate what
divided good, high-quality advice from bad, low-quality advice. In both eras,
the understanding of good advice tended to reflect an ideal of broad
judgment over narrow technicalities. Perhaps this reflects a certain
philosophy of law shared by some tax lawyers over these decades, or perhaps
it reflects a high degree of personal satisfaction found in a certain
professional approach. Ironically, the 1965-1985 attacks on the technical
orientations to tax advice were themselves increasingly technical.4 53 By
1985, lawyers were left subject to incomparably more technical regulation of
their profession than they had in 1965, though the tax shelter industry was far
more damaged by the passive activity loss rules and taxpayer penalty
provisions than this new approach to professional regulation.
Whatever the effect of the new approach to professional ethics in
terms of client compliance and revenue protection, the change in tone
between the periods is attention-grabbing. It is tempting to infer that the
change reflects perhaps a loss of innocence in America or an increase in
realism in Americans between 1945 and 1985. But given that the writers of
the 1945-1965 periods were the ones who had witnessed the Soviet liberation
of Auschwitz and the American obliteration of Hiroshima, it is implausible
to argue they lived in a morally simpler or more innocent time. They
certainly did not have a more naYve view of tax administration either, given
that the 1950s' corruption scandals at the Bureau of Internal Revenue (which
resulted in renaming the bureau as the IRS) had no counterpart in 1965-
1985.454 If the change cannot be described in large part as due to a loss of
innocence of some type, one might conclude at least a loss of optimism as to
the government's role. Generally, of course, the post-Vietnam and post-
Watergate years in America are associated with a decline in trust in public
institutions. But many of the 1965-1985 writers evidence considerable trust
in the federal government. After all, there were the calls for greater (not less)
government involvement in their clients' affairs through greater penalties to
452. Compare Hatfield, Legal Ethics, supra note 4, at 40 (quoting Miller,
Morality in Tax Planning, supra note 8 1, at 1076), with supra Parts IV.A, IV.C.
453. See supra Parts II.B, II.C, III.B.
454. More than 200 then-current and former tax officials resigned, were
removed, and/or were indicted. In 1952, Truman released a plan that reorganized the
Bureau, and the reorganization carried over into the Eisenhower administration.
Joseph J. Thorndike, Reforming the Internal Revenue Service: A Comparative
History, 53 ADMIN. L. REv. 717, 755-59, 761-64 (2001).
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encourage compliance.455 There were also intense and sustained efforts to
cooperate with the Treasury Department's call for greater standards and
oversight.456 Indeed, in the end with Treasury's adoption of the bar's
standards, the episode may be interpreted as a considerable success story of
cooperation with the government.
Even if, in substantive terms, a particular tax scheme was to be
rejected by lawyers in both periods, one wonders if something was lost or
something gained with the differences in understanding why the scheme
should be rejected. What are the differences between Merle Miller analyzing
the transaction in 1952 while considering his "great duty to the country
that . . . educated him, and made possible his present success," and a tax
lawyer in 1985 trying instead to decide if the conclusion had a "realistic
possibility of success on the merits if litigated"? 4" What are the differences
between Merle Miller's conscious devotion to his county's revenue needs
and a lawyer in 1985 devoted to his client's need to avoid a penalty? Is
"realistic possibility of success" clearer in practical terms than the older
appeal to patriotism? Does pondering penalties rather than patriotism better
clarify how to proceed? Is aiming to avoid penalties on your client the same
as yourself aiming to be ethical? Does it make any difference in terms of
professional anxiety, aspiration, or satisfaction? Does it make a difference in
who counts as a good tax lawyer? Does it make a difference in understanding
the good it is that tax lawyers do?
455. See supra Part III.B.
456. See supra Parts II.B, I.C, III.B.
457. Compare Hatfield, Legal Ethics, supra note 4, at 19 (quoting Miller,
Morality in Tax Planning, supra note 8 1, at 1083), with supra Parts II.C, II.D.
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